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Foreword
In this Newport Paper, Frank G. Goldman questions the adequacy of
traditional nonproliferation strategies to deter the spread of nuclear weapons.
While the subject is sensitive and the proposed solution perhaps radical, Mr.
Goldman's argument is one that merits discussion. He examines counter-pro
liferation as an alternative, supplemental strategy-a potentially valuable
approach which the nation should not dismiss. Acknowledging the severe
obstacles in the way of its employment, he contends that counter-proliferation
offers a way to fill an important policy void.
Mr. Goldman's careful and responsible exploration of the international
legal aspects of counter-proliferation makes this work especially valuable.
Its publication should stimulate productive thought and generate insight
on a su bject vi tal to the security communi ty, precisely the goals of the Naval
War College's Newport Papers .

. R. S ark

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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Counter-Proliferation: Reconsidering the Traditional
U.S. Approach to Nuclear Nonproliferation

F

OR NEARLY THREE DECADES the United States, in cooperation with
many nations, has sought to prevent the proliferation of nuclear

weapons. The premise of this endeavor has been that this nation, its allies,
and the entire international community are most stable when as few states
as possible possess these weapons. By and large, nonproliferation efforts
l
have proved successful inasmuch as only a handful of states have devel
oped a nuclear capability since the signing of the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NYf). 2 The Clinton administration, as its prede

cessors, has promised to maintain this commitment. In a 1993 address to
the United Nations, President Bill Clinton announced his intention to
3
make nonproliferation a priority of the administration. He reiterated this
commitment to the non roliferation regime and the NPT in a foreign policy

address in March 1995.

f

However, with the conclusion of the Cold War and the dismantling of
the political foundation that it provided, questions have surfaced about the
continued viability of this "nonproliferation regime." Given the changes
in the international political order, can the traditional nonproliferation
strategies succeed? What alternatives or supplements to these traditional
strategies may the United States and the world community implement as
they attempt to fortify the nonproliferation regime? This paper explores
the international legal ramifications of one suggested supplemental strat
egy: counter-proliferation.
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Counter-proliferation may be defined as measures ranging from eco
nomic embargoes to military intervention designed to inhibit, restrain, or
5
destroy the nuclear development programs of a potential proliferant.
These methods include passive measures such as export controls designed
to delay the weapons design program of a potential proliferant. They also
may include more aggressive techniques such as the surreptitious intro
duction of computer viruses designed to disrupt the proliferant's comput
ing capacity. Most dramatically, counter-proliferation efforts include the
use of military force against those nations or groups devoted to the devel
opment of a nuclear weapon. This study addresses all of these matters but
focuses on this last, most aggressive form of counter-proliferation.
The traditional nonproliferation regime concentrates on inspections
and the accounting of fissionable material by the International Atomic
Energy Agency

(IAEA) in addition to the use of unilateral and multilateral

export controls which are designed to limit the unregulated spread of
nuclear materials. The traditional regime also relies upon the commit
ments of nonnuclear states, pursuant to the NPT, to forego the construction
6
of nuclear weapons. In contrast to these relatively passive forms of non
proliferation, which require the cooperation of the nonnuclear states,
counter-proliferation measures, if implemented, would be designed to
prohibit directly the acquisition, development, manufacture, testing, and
deployment of a nuclear weapon by the potential proliferant.
A strategy of counter-proliferation would break with traditional U.S.
nonproliferation efforts by aggressively seeking to prevent the develop
ment of nuclear weapons. U.S. policy makers currently are studying this
strategy as an alternative or supplement to the present reliance on the
traditional regime

? The U.S. Department of Defense, through its Counter

Proliferation Initiative, is exploring what role counter-proliferation strate
8
gies and tactics will play in post-Cold War U.S. defense policy.

This study posits a three-part thesis. First, after an analysis of the current
tenets of international law, the study argues that a unilateral U.S. applica
tion of an aggressive counter-proliferation strategy is inconsistent with
current norms of international law. Second, despite this inconsistency,
policy makers in the United States should not abandon the counter-prolif
eration strategy, because an occasion may arise when the United States will
be unable to tolerate the imminent development of a nuclear weapon by an
adversary with goals adverse to the vital interests of this nation. Third,
however, the study contends that U.S. policy makers should not attempt
to mold international law through diplomacy so that counter-proliferation

2
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becomes normatively acceptable throughout the international community.
While such an endeavor is attractive at first blush, such a strategy, if
successful, would be counterproductive to V.S.interests because it would
permi t nations other than the Vnited States to legitimately launch counter
proliferation attacks, perhaps even against V.S. allies. While unilateral
counter-proliferation efforts risk the condemnation of the international
community, any attempt to legitimize counter-preliferation internation
ally might provide other states with the type of political cover needed to
launch military attacks that are adverse to V.S. interests.

3

II
The Traditional U.S. Approach to Nonproliferation

B

EFORE COMMENCING a detailed examination of counter-prolifera
tion, this paper must explain the workings of the traditional U.S.

approach to nonproliferation and why this strategy, standing alone, may
no longer be viable.

U.S. Reliance on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT)
Two prongs comprise the traditional American approach to nonprolif
eration. The first relies on the NPT to ensure that signatory nations do not
develop nuclear warheads. Nonnuclear states that submit to the NPT
9
promise to forego the development of nuclear weapons. In exchange for
this commitment, the nuclear states promise not to transfer nuclear
lO
weapons or assist other states in the manufacture of these weapons. The
ll
NPT also requires that parties submit to IAEA safeguards,
which take an
accounting of the fissionable material possessed by each nonnuclear signa
tory state. The IAEA's task is to confirm that these states have not diverted
fissionable material to a weapons development program.
Generally, the NPf has been successful in achieving its goal that nonnu
clear states will not clandestinely develop nuclear warheads. However, the

record of the NPT regime has not been flawless. First, a few nations have

not signed the Treaty and thus are outside its purview. India, which
exploded a "nuclear device" in 1974, and Israel, which reportedly possesses
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a small nuclear arsenal, have not signed the Treaty. Moreover, some states
that have signed and ratified the NPT have resisted its provisions. Iraq
clandestinely pursued a weapons development program during the 1980s.

The IAEA only discovered the extent of this program in the aftermath of

the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Iran, another NPT signatory, also has pursued
12
a nuclear capability. Most recently, North Korea has proven reluctant to
abide by its NPT commitments, having prevented IAEA inspectors from
thoroughly examining North Korean nuclear facilities to ensure that the
North Koreans are not diverting fissionable material to a weapons devel
opment program. The United States, South Korea, and North Korea
negotiated a framework to resolve this issue in October 1994. This agree
ment provided that North Korea would curtail its nuclear program in
exchange for a $4 billion light-water nuclear reactor. The Korean Penin
sula Energy Development Organization

(KEDO), comprised of repre

sentatives from the United States, South Korea and Japan, was established
to iron out the details of this agreement. Since its founding in March 1995,

KEDO has grown to nine members, including Australia, New Zealand,
Finland, Canada, Indonesia and Chile. Since its inception, KEDO has
received over $87 million from its members, including $31.5 million from

the United States Y

In May 1995, the international community extended the NPT indefi

nitely. This extension represents a constructive development for the cur
rent nonproliferation regime. President Clinton noted that the indefinite
extension "testifies to a deep and abiding international commitment to
14
confront the dangers posed by nuclear weapons.,, While the NPT exten
sion reinforces the current nonproliferation regime, the treaty's ability to
contain the spread of nuclear weapons still is uncertain. Several nations
remain outside its scope, most notably India and Israel. Several other states
have skirted its provisions. Consequently, while the NPT is an important
element in the international community's endeavors to control the spread
of proliferation, it can not and will not guarantee that rogue nations will
forego their pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Export Controls
The use of controls to limit the export of sensitive technologies which
nations could employ in the production of nuclear weapons represents the
second prong of the traditional U.S. nonproliferation strategy. The United
States has implemented these controls both unilaterally through domestic

6
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legisl ation and multilaterally in cooperation with other states concerned
about proliferation risks. An example of a multilateral organization that
assists in the nonproliferation effort is the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which
seeks to contro l the export of fissionab le material to potential proliferants.
Another multi lateral organization that might have been employed to assist
in the nonproliferation effort is the Coordinating Committee for Multilat
eral Export Controls (COCOM). Though this organization concentrated its
efforts on limiting technological exports to the Soviet Bloc, its controls
could have b een used against states pursui ng the nuclear option. However,
15
COCOM disbanded on 31 March 1995. Thus, controls on the export of
dual-use technology have weakened. 1 6 In September 1995, negotiations for
a replacement to COCOM were negotiated in Paris. This new organization,
called the "New Forum," includes Russia among its memb ers. While
Russian participation may b e useful, doubts exist about that nation's
commitment to the control of the spread of nuclear technology. "As the
case of the Russian-Iranian reactor deal graphically demonstrates, Moscow
has proven reluctant to deny its cli ents whatever hardware they want. At a
minimum, Moscow can be expected to serve as the mi ddleman for transfers
of any technology that might yet be denied the likes of Iraq and North
17
Korea but that can be sold to the former Soviet Union.,, China is not a
memb er of the New Forum, due largely to U.S. concerns about its exports
to Pakistan and Iran. The New Forum, while a useful organization, does
not possess the means to enforce its provisions.
The United States also takes unilateral measures in an attempt to control
proliferation. For example, the Export Administration Act of 1979 estab
lishes limi ts on the type and amount of sophisti cated technology that V.S.
18
manufacturers may export. Additionally, the Department of Commerce
controls the export of sensitive nuclear technologies pursuant to the Nu
19
clear Non-Proli feration Act of 1978. However, the Clinton administra
tion, which has set the expansion of trade as one of its primary goals, has
lifted export controls over certain sophisticated products. Furthermore, in
1993, the standards that control the export of V.S. m ainframe computers
were eased to allow greater exports. Thus, the V.S. commitment to certain
categories of export controls appears to be wavering.
Moreover, two factors cast doubt on the ability of export controls to
prevent the spread of sophisticated technology. First, many types of tech
nologies are applicable to b oth civilian and military purposes. Preventing
the export of such "dual use" items b ecause they might be used in a weapons
development program is both difficul t and costly to V.S. business i nterests.
7
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Second, in an increasingly competitive global economic environment,
exporters from other nations less concerned about proliferation risks might
fill any void created by the unwillingness of the U.S. government to allow
the export of sophisticated American technology.

Weakening the Prongs
The force of recent events has weakened both prongs of the traditional
U.S. nonproliferation strategy. On the one hand, theNPT has not succeeded
fully in calming fears of proliferation. On the other, the U ni ted States has
eased its export control programs in order to enable a competitive trade
policy. Given these realities and the fact that the geopolitical landscape
differs markedly from the days of the Cold War, when both superpowers
could influence their allies and client states on nonproliferation issues, the
Clinton administration has identified a need to examine alternatives to
traditional American nonproliferation approaches. Hence, the administra
tion has decided to explore the area of counter-proliferation. On 7 Decem
ber 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced the Defense
Counter-Proliferation Initiative. The Initiative explores the possibility of
20
developing a more aggressive U.S. stance on nonproliferation. As part of

!J

this initiative, the Pentagon is to study new weapon s stems specifically
designed to destroy the assets of a potential proliferant. 1 For example, the

Pentagon is researching weapon systems that could destroy hidden devel
22
opment sites. The Initiative also created an office within the Department
23
of Defense to articulate and implement this strategy.
The current interest in counter-proliferation raises serious policy issues
regarding both its status pursuant to international law and its political
legitimacy in the post-Cold War world. These issues provide the frame
work for this study. This study will not address the likelihood of success
of any U.S. counter-proliferation strike, for that question is beyond the
scope of the paper, and research was not conducted on the likelihood of
success or failure of such a strike. Rather, the paper concentrates on the
international law aspects of counter-proliferation, assessing for those pur
poses whether a counter-proliferation strategy is advisable. Of course, U.S.

policy makers must take into account the tactical and strategic as well as

the legal particulars of any application of a counter-proliferation strategy.

8

III
Counter-Proliferation: Defining the Issues

The Legal Issues
EFINED BY ONE SCHOLAR as "the body of rules and principles of

Daction which are binding upon civilized states in their relations with

one another,,,

24

in ternational law is vital to the United States. This country,

as a preeminent economic and military power, relies upon the rule of
international law to provide a stable framework in which to conduct its
international affairs. Without the existence of these rules, the United
States, along with the other nations of the international community, could
not conduct its affairs with any degree of certainty. The absence of such
rules would create a chaotic environment in which nations would act
without guidelines, and the possibility of violent conflicts would increase
substantially. The existence of these legal norms creates a relatively stable
environment in which members of the international community may
conduct their affairs with some confidence.
However, the implementation of a strategy of counter-proliferation
would raise serious questions of international law, particularly in the public
international law areas of intervention and self-defense, as well as in the
area of the law of war and armed conflict. These questions include:
•

•
•

Would the world community recognize the counter-proliferation
strategy as lawful?
If so, under what circumstances?
May an aggressive counter-proliferation policy exist in a world
community predominantly based on the international legal norms
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of sovereignty and nonintervention? Or have these norms deterio
rated to the point where a counter-proliferation action would be
legitimate under certain mitigating circumstances?
•

•

•

How are such measures addressed by international legal instru
ments, such as the Charter of the United Nations and the NPT?
What type of precedent would a coun ter-proliferation endeavor set
for future acts of intervention conducted either unilaterally or
multilaterally?
What recent precedents provide lessons for those nations consid
ering the counter-proliferation strategy?

The Realpolitik Questions
Beyond these legal questions are several

realpolitik

issues which U.S.

policy makers must address before implementing a counter-proliferation
strategy. These questions include:
•

•

•

•

Would a counter-proliferation policy be desirable even if legally
untenable? If legally tenable?
What ale the likely consequences of either exercising or announc
ing a counter-proliferation policy?
Should the United States implement a counter-proliferation strat
egy unilaterally, or should it attempt to b
d a multilateral coali
tion willing to undertake such endeavors?

�

More generally, what political costs are associated with counter
proliferation?

Without an understanding of the political dimensions of this issue, U.S.
defense planners might develop a comprehensive counter-proliferation
military s tra tegy which, for practical political reasons, would be impossib Ie
to implement.

10

IV
Intervention and Counter-Proliferation

CTING

A

SOLELY OR AS A MEMBER of a multilateral coalition, the

United States may attempt to justify a counter-proliferation action

on the international legal theories of justified intervention and preemptive
self-defense. Broad international acceptance of these theories as applied to
counter-proliferation might enable the United States or a multilateral
coalition to em loy these techniques without violating the norms of inter
2
national law.
Alternatively, if these theories are not accepted, broad

J'

international condemnation can be expected. Consequently, U.S. defense
planners must address these critical legal issues if they are to make accurate
assessments regarding the international acceptability of counter-prolifera
tion. Moreover, the acceptability of counter-proliferation measures may
depend on whether they are conducted unilaterally or multilaterally. Thus,
it is important to analyze these legal questions from both perspectives.

Intervention Generally
International law generally prohibi ts intervention. As Lori Fisler Dam
rosch notes:
International law has condemned and sought to constrain [interven
tion] because of a conviction that important values are served by
allowing each polity to develop in its own way within internationally
recognized boundaries. The legal rules against intervention are espe
cially cherished by those who see them as essential s afeguards for
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sma1l7r states a ��inst abuses at the hands of states that can wield vastly
supenor power.
28
Article 2(4) of the U.N . Charter reflects this conviction. It states, "All
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
29
Nations.,,
Historically, intervention has not always been universally condemned
despite its present status. Before World War I, when the Great Powers of
30
Europe dominated the internationallandscape, a tacit systern existed that
permitted each Great Power to intervene in conflicts outside of Europe so
long as that Power conducted the action within its own imperial domain.
In other words, intervention was permissible so long as one Great Power
31
did not explicitly violate the interests of another. In exchange for the
freedom to intervene in their areas of national interest beyond Europe, each
Power implicitly agreed to respect existing boundaries on the Continent
itself. The system reflected the mutual interests of the elite states of Europe
in dominating an undeveloped world through colonialism, while promot
ing continental stability.Intervention became a tool in the pre-First World
War balance-of-power system.
This system came crashing down around the Great Powers when they
32
However, the exist

ceased to respect the established borders of Europe.

ence of this bifurcated system permitting colonial intervention while
prohibiting continental invasion demonstrates that the international com
munity has not always accepted the current norm compelling universal
nonintervention. "It is important to note . " that the present means of law
enforcement available to states is considerably more restricted than that
33
provided for in the classical period of international law.,,
The current norm is the product of a perceived need by post-World War
II leaders to protect the principle of sovereignty. These leaders attributed
the cause of World WarII to the refusal of Germany and Japan to respect
international borders. Following the war, leaders of the Allied nations
recognized a need to construct international institutions that would pre
vent future erosion of sovereignty by making unilateral intervention ille
gitimate. Not surprisingly, the creators of the United Nations fashioned a
legal system that could deal effectively with the type of problems, such as
invasion, which sparked World War II; however, this system, with its
emphasis on the principle of sovereignty, necessarily limits the ability of
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states to deal with different dilemmas, including the proliferation of
34
nuclear weapons. As Jost Delbriick notes:

The responsibility of states for the enforcement of international erga
omnes norms and the responsibility of the community of states for the
enforcement of international law protecting public international com
munity interests do not provide a legal basis fr r military enforcement
measures outside the U.N. Charter's system. 3
The U.N. Charter codifies this strategy. Article 2(1) states that "The
Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
36
Members.,,
Given the fundamental premise that one state is neither
better nor worse than another, and sovereignty is paramount, intervention
becomes illegitimate. Article 2(4), quoted above, reflects this conviction.
Article 2(7), which prohibits intervention by the United Nations, except
in instances when the Securi ty Council deems necessary, further reinforces

the prominence of sovereignty by generally permittinl governments to
3
handle internal disputes without ou tside in terference.
Consequently, when examined in historical terms, as Marc Trachten
berg points out, "intervention should generally be thought of as part of a
38
system ....,, That system, as codified by the U.N. Charter, traditionally
39
has frowned upon intervention.
However, just as the system prior to
World War I became outdated by world events, the possibility exists that
the present system has outlived its usefulness. The time may be ripe for the
most powerful of the international community to consider whether inter
vention should become acceptable for limited purposes.
Unilateral Intervention and Counter-Proliferation

Under present tenets of international law, the world community likely
would condemn an instance of unilateral intervention to destroy the
weapons development programs of a potential proliferant. The one explicit
example of the use of unilateral force to destroy the nuclear facilities of
40
another state produced such a reaction. WhenIsraeli F-16s destroyed the
Osirak nuclear reactor under construction near Baghdad in June 1981, the
international response was immediate, and the United Nations condemned
41
Despite the threat posed to the region by the nascent

the Israeli action.

existence of an Iraqi nuclear program, the international community felt
compelled to depict the Israeli action as violative of international law.
While the status ofIsrae1 within the international community casts doubt

13
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upon the value of this precedent, at a minimum, the condemnation should
give pause to any nation contemplating similar action.

Given this precedent, the likelihood that a unilateral counter-prolifera

tion effort would draw the ire of the international community is great. After

all, the U.N. Charter explicitly condemns unilateral intervention. Nonin

tervention is the norm, and states, particularly those of the Third World,
are unlikely to see the cause of strict nonproliferation, despite its impor

tance to the industrialized world, as a justification for unilateral action. As
Virginia Gamba explains, "[P]owerless states have come to view interven

tion with deep misgivings, either because they have been direct recipients
of it or because they have had to condition their options so as to avoid it ....
42
Intervention has become associated with the loss of freedom.,,
Forced to

make the choice between conceding a portion of their sovereignty or
sacrificing a strict nonproliferation regime, less powerful states dependent

upon the present norm are likely to opt for the latter. A unilateral counter

proliferation effort initiated by the United States, for example, would create
a precedent that many developing, less powerful states might find unac

ceptable.

ospect of proliferation chiefly con
One must bear in mind that the
,w
cerns the current nuclear powers. 3 These nations in particular have

classified proliferation as a threat to international peace and securit '
l
While the possibility of proliferation also concerns less developed states, 4

the poorer nations are unlikely to surrender a portion of their sovereignty

solely for the sake of the current order upon which the present nuclear
powers depend.4S The developed states, particularly those which possess
nuclear weapons, have a greater interest in maintaining the nonprolifera

tion regime. First, states equipped with nuclear weapons are thought to be
less subject to pressure from states without a nuclear capability. Second,

while the developed states, by and large, are less subject to pressure by the

international community, smaller states employ the concept of sovereignty

as a shield from pressures placed upon them by the industrialized world.
These smaller states-greatly in the majority of the General Assem

bly-are unlikely to accede to a weakening of the sovereignty concept.

For the United States, these priorities mean that the international

community likely would condemn unilateral counter-proliferation efforts

involving U.S. military forces for which the United States does not have
U.N. authorization. In conducting a counter-proliferation attack, the

United States would be in prima facie violation of several provisions of the
U.N. Charter, including Article 2(3),

14
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Article 2(4), and Article 33(1),

Counter-Proliferation Strategy
which demands that parties attempt to settle their disputes peacefully.

47

The fact that the United States has a veto in the U.N. Security Council
would do little to change the perception in the world community that the
counter-proliferation act was de facto illegal. Unilateral intervention de
signed to save an imperfect nonproliferation regime, despite laudable goals,
is incompatible with current international law.

Multilateral Intervention and Counter-Prolifer ation
If U.S. policy makers deem unilateral intervention unacceptable, one
alternative they might pursue in their quest to prevent proliferation would
be to expand the scope of any counter-proliferation effort from a unilateral
endeavor to a multilateral one. The approval and participation of the
international community would enhance the legitimacy of any interven
tion designed to prevent proliferation. As Robert Pastor observes, "Just as
congressional consent for a U.S. military action gives the president a
cushion of support, collective action is, in the long term, more effective
48
than unilateral action in forging an international community.,,
Currently, the legitimacy of multilateral intervention for any pU

r.R 0se is

being debated widely among international lawyers and scholars.

9

The

protection of human rights, for example, is often proposed as a basis that
would justify multilateral intervention. The entrance of forces sanctioned
by the United Nations into Somalia in 1992 was predicated upon the need
So
However,

for humanitarian assistance to its threatened civilian populace.

multiple legal barriers, including many of those standing in the path of
unilateral intervention, exist in the pursuance of a workable multilateral
strategy.
The first such obstacle is the U.N. Charter itself, which, as noted
above, rests upon a presumption prohibiting intervention. Chapter VII
of the Charter does provide for U.N. intervention in limited circum
stances. Specifically, Article 42 states, "Should the Security Council
consider that measures provided for in Article 41 [measures not involv
ing the use of force] would be inadequate or have proved to be inade
quate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be
Sl
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."
The United Nations has employed this power sparingly, generally due
to the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union were at odds in
many of the disputes in which the United Nations might have played a

15
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role. Each superpower either utilized a veto or threatened to utilize one to
block collective U.N. initiatives.
However, with the collapse of bipolarity, the United Nations has taken
a more active role in the use of i ts intervention powers. The support by the
United Nations of the U.S.-led coalition which ousted Iraqi forces from
Kuwait in 1991 provides an example of this increased willingness to
support intervention. As part of the action to free Kuwait, a coalition of
military forces led by the United States and supported by the United
Nations attacked Iraqi nuclear assets. Thus, counter-proliferation became
S2
one of the elements employed to justify coalition action against Iraq.
Overall, the ability of the United Nations to exercise its intervention
S3
Perhaps someday the Security Council will

powers appears to be growing.

have the ability to call on its own dedicated forces pursuant to Article 43
S4
Still, legal

of the Charter to intercede against potential proliferants.

restraints on the use of U.N. forces continue to frustrate U.N. measures.
For example, even if multilateral, intervention carries with it an element
of imperialism. As Marc Trachtenberg states, "[T]he powerful states at the
cen ter of the system will never themselves be the target of interventions of
this sort.,,55

It remains to be seen whether the United Nations could exercise these
powers to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. First, the political
problems of building multilateral coalitions to take military action are
substantial. One need only examine the difficulty in building a coalition
to intervene in the hostilities in the Balkans to understand the political
difficulties inherent in coalition construction. Even the U.S.-led coalition
S6
against Iraq had limited objectives. While the United States considered
expanding the goals of the coalition to include the ouster oflraqi President
Saddam Hussein, U.S. leaders ultimately decided not to initiate such an
action, and Hussein remains in office.
Moreover, a multilateral endeavor often does not accomplish its tasks as
efficiently as a unilateral effort. Coalition-building requires compromises
which may prevent optimal counter-proliferation operations. An examina
tion of the effort against Iraq is illustrative, as the U.S.-led coalition ceased
offensive operations before ousting Saddam Hussein in order to ensure the
S7
political continuity of its multilateral force. President George Bush and
his advisors believed that marching to Baghdad would have gone beyond
the Security Council's specific authorization, jeopardizing the coalition's
integrity, particularly among its Arab partners which might not have
accepted a wider mandate against Iraq.
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Alternatives
Since unilateral acts of counter-proliferation cannot lawfully exist
within the current international framework, and acts of multilateral inter
vention, which themselves have legal difficulties, often fail to accomplish
their objectives, the question arises as to what options U.S. defense plan
ners possess when confronted with a rogue state on the verge of acquiring
or developing a nuclear weapon. When faced with this scenario, policy
makers are left with three alternatives, none of which is without flaws. The
first is to abandon the strategy of counter-proliferation entirely, due to its
apparent illegality. The second option is to pursue the strategy in spite of
the present norm against unilateral intervention and the barriers to mul
tilateral intervention. The third choice is to attempt to forge an updated
norm creating an alternative legal framework which would permit the
strategy, whether implemented unilaterally or multilaterally, to coexist
with present international legal rules. Each alternative possesses potential
costs and benefits. This section analyzes the strategy's respective strengths
and weaknesses, attempting to define and sharpen the legal issues so that
policy makers will be able to make informed decisions which will further
U.S. nonproliferation goals.

Abandoning the Counter-Proliferation Strategy.

Abandoning the coun ter

proliferation strategy offers the first alternative to U.S. planners. The chief
legal advantage of this approach is that it would provide the U nited States
with an avenue to avoid the le gal consequences that could result from
intervention generally and counter-proliferation specifically. Among the
possible adverse consequences facing the United States if it were to stage a
counter-proliferation attack are that it risks international condemnation,
alliance strain, threatens the nonproliferation regime and the NPT and, in
its most extreme form, risks the initiation of war. If the United States
desires to avoid these risks, then dismissing the counter-proliferation
option would be the easiest course. The United States and its allies have a
great deal invested in the current international legal order and the nonpro
liferation regime. Taking measures, such as the most aggressive form of
counter-proliferation, that could jeopardize the canons of international law
would create substantial dangers for those nations most dependent upon
that system's survival.
On the other hand, if the United States were to abandon the counter
proliferation strategy, it would incur costs, including accepting the fact that
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it would be unab le to prevent the development of a nu clear weapon by a
rogue state. For example, despite the recent fragile agreement between

North Korea and the United States, at some point the United States, along

with its alli es in the region, mi h t b e forced to accep t the existence of a
5
North Korean nuclear weapon. U.S. leaders may be willing to accep t this

f

result as the p rice for maintaining the current international legal order. Of

course, the United States also might attempt to enforce the trad itional
norms against nonproliferation b y imposing sanctions against the poten

tial proliferant and urging other s tates to do the same. However, as noted
earlier, the traditio nal nonproliferation strategies may no t be adequate to

the task of preventing the truly dedicated p roliferant from p roducing a

nuclear weapon .

Ignoring the Legal Consequences o/Counter-Proli/eration.

The l egal ad

vantages (as opposed to any political or national security advantages) of

ignoring the current i nternational legal prohibition on intervention are
difficult to detect. For reasons of national security, U.S. decision makers

might be wil ling to make this sacrifice to h alt pro liferation. However, since

the application of unil ateral counter-proliferation measures is aprima/acie

violation of the U.N. Charter, no immediate legal advantage would result.

One potential long-term legal advantage, if one b elieves a policy of

counter-proliferation is desirable, is that it would set the preced ent fo r
future counter-proliferation effons. Basically, the first U.S. coun ter-prolif

eration strike would set the stage for future effons, making them easier to
justify. Such a counter-proliferation strike also migh t deter states consid

ering the development of weapons of mass destruction from initiating a

program. Finally, by demonstrating its willingness to use counter-prolif

eration, the United States might fo rce potential p roliferan ts to move their

programs underground, thereby increasing developmental costs and ex
tending the time needed to produce a nuclear weapon.

The costs of violating the norm would appear to b e high. The interna

tional community likely would condemn the United States for violations

of the U.N. Chaner. Moreover, the counter-proliferation action would

undermine, perhaps fatally, the nonproliferation regi me by demonstrating
that the NPT had failed, at least wi th respect to the nation subjected to the

counter-proliferation strike. Desp i te these consequences, the United S tates
might absorb the costs, which also might include alliance strain-and

possibly war-if it firmly b elieved that the al ternative of a nuclear
equipped rogue state is unaccep table.
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Creating a Norm Permitting Counter-Proliferation.

The third alternative

involves an attempt by the United States to assist in the development of a
new international legal norm permitting intervention for the specific
purpose of destroying the weapons development programs of potential
proliferants. The establishment of this new norm thereby would justify
U.S. counter-proliferation activities. Intervention for these limited pur
poses would no longer violate international law. In undertaking this effort,
the United States would have to maintain that the legal standards that have
existed since the conclusion of World War II have become antiquated with
the end of the Cold War. Consequently, the international community must
develop updated norms addressing the problems of the post-Cold War era.
Limited intervention to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons would
become one component of this new system.
The benefits of the successful adoption of this strategy are that it would
permit the United States to engage in necessary counter-proliferation
activities without drawing the ire of the international community. Of
course, convincing this community that counter-proliferation should be
come a norm in the international legal system would not be easy. The
diplomatic task would be enormous, perhaps impossible, requiring a radi
cal expansion in the interpretation of the U.N. Charter. In effect, an
exception would have to be crafted into the Charter, allowing for unilateral
intervention for the purpose of preventing nuclear proliferation. At a
minimum, the U.N. Security Council would need to authorize a counter
proliferation strike, through some approval mechanism, presumably on a
case by case basis. However, such authorization might be impossible to
obtain in those circumstances when a permanent Security Council member
protects the potential proliferant through the use of a veto. Thus, the
Security Council might be able to authorize counter-proliferation actions
against only the most isolated pariah states.
Even if the international community were to adopt this proposal, costs
would still accrue. Its adoption also would demonstrate the failings of the
nonproliferation regime's current dependence on the NPT. Moreover, the
adoption of this scheme would drive a wedge between the nuclear "haves"
and "have-nots." To a large extent, the scheme would resemble the system
that existed in the international community prior to World War I, with the
nuclear powers cast in the role of the Great Powers of Europe. Not without
some justification, smaller, nonnuclear states could label this new system
"nuclear imperialism."
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Additionally, if a counter-proliferation exception to the prohibition
against intervention were to exist for the United States, it would be difficult
to condemn similar activities

conducted

by another state which felt com

pelled to take action against an adversary's w eapons development program.
Finally, the danger exists that counter-proliferation could become a con

venient excuse for all types of intervention, whether justified or not. Taken
together,

these obstacles

might prove too difficult to overcome to permit

the creation of a counter-proliferation exception. The international com
munity, believing that the potential costs of this updated system would
outweigh any possible benefits, simply may be unwilling to expand the
present tenets of international law to permit a strategy of counter-prolif

eration. If this conclusion proves true, then the United States (or any other
state contemplating the adoption of a counter-proliferation strategy) either
will have to accept the costs such a strategy entails or discover another
justification for its actions.

20
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Counter-Proliferation and the Concept of
Anticipatory Self-Defense

�� JHILE THE CONCEPT OF INTERVENTION provides one avenue to
'0/ '0/ explore in this examination of counter-proliferation, another legal
concept meriting discussion is the doctrine of self-defense. Specifically, a
nation facing the prospect that its historic adversary may develop a nuclear
warhead in the near future may feel compelled to respond militarily to its
adversary's nuclear program. The question becomes whether the interna
tional doctrine of self-defense justifies such a response. The following
section analyzes the legal principles of self-defense to develop an answer.

The Hypothetical Case
Imagine that at some future time State X becomes concerned about the
nuclear program of its historic adversary, State Y. While State Y claims
that its program exists solely for peaceful purposes, State X, as well as much
of the international community, is skeptical. Intelligence reports suggest
that State Y is clandestinely developing the capacity to enrich uranium and
reprocess plutonium. Furthermore, State Y is importing dual-use technol
ogy that can assist in the construction of a nuclear warhead. State X has
expressed its concerns to the international community through the Secu
rityCouncil of the United Nations, but due to political considerations, the
United Nations has taken no action. While the Security Council has
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threatened to impose token sanctions, extensive measures that would prove
effective are unlikely to be forthcoming.
Given these facts and perceiving a need to counter State V's pending
proliferation, State X feels compelled for reasons of national security to
address the situation unilaterally. Fearing the development of nuclear
weapons by State Y, State X attacks the nuclear facilities of State Y,
destroying those facilities that it believes are integral components of an
ongoing weapons development program. State X believes that its action is
justified as an act of anticipatory self-defense. It reasons that the threat
presented by State V's nuclear program was unacceptable. A nuclear-armed
State Y, in the opinion of the leaders of State X, would have attacked State
X. Fearing this scenario, State X decides that it cannot afford to wait any
longer to protect itself. Furthermore, given the mild efforts by the inter
national community to stem State V's activities, State X feels it cannot
afford to await effective international sanctions.
International reaction to the news of the destruction of State V's nuclear
facili ties is swift. The international community roundly criticizes State X.
The SecurityCouncil censures State X for violating the V.N. Charter and
threatens sanctions against State X. Many nations believe the attack threat
ens the nonproliferation regime, whose members renewed the NPT in 1995.
The international community rejects StateX's self-defense arguments, and
the SecurityCouncil passes a resolution condemning State X for violating
Article 2(3) and Article 2(4) of theCharter, as well as for endangering the
integrity of the NPT.

A Question of Self-Defense
Although in this hypothetical scenario the international community
condemns State X's action, one should inquire whether the preemptive
attack truly was illegal pursuant to current norms of international law.
When may a state re
a preemptive strike?

� on the concept of anticipatory self-defense to justify
Does the V.N.Charter prohibit anticipatory self-de

fense entirely? If not, under what circumstances may a state resort to
anticipatory self-defense to solve a perceived risk to its national security?
If international law does prohibit the use of unilateral anticipatory self-de
fense, is this ban sound in an era of heightened proliferation concerns? Or
may a state justify its act of counter-proliferation on the basis of anticipa
tory self-defense? These questions are the focus of this section.
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U .S. defense p lanners may feel compelled to take mili tary actio n against
a potential proliferant. I f the concept of anticipatory self-defense justifies
i ts action, the Uni ted States may be able to avoid in ternational condem n a
tion for violations of i n ternational law. Moreover, if the in ternational
communi ty accepts a future claim of coun ter-proliferation as anticipatory
self-defense, l ater acts may prove easier to justify, both for the U ni ted S tates
and other nations consideri ng counter-proliferation strikes .

Analytical Method
This portion o f the paper analyzes whether the international law of
anticipatory self-defen se or the related concept of reprisal would support a
U.S. strategy of counter-proliferation. Fi rst, it explores the curren t state of
international law in the area of anticipatory self-defense. Two bodies of
law, cus tomary i n ternational law and the Charter of the United Nations,
i nfluence though t on anticipatory self-defense. Following this examina

tion of the law, the 198 1 Israeli attack on the I raqi nuclear reactor known

as

Tarnuz I n ear Baghdad i s analyzed in an attempt to discover whether

international condemnation following that attack was warranted . Another
question examined is whether policy makers in the United States may
uti lize th e concept of an ticipatory s elf-defen se as a too l to support a s trategy
of counter-proliferation . The poten tial barriers U . S . leaders would face i n
attempting to justify t h e s trategy o n this basis are described .
I n Chap ter V I th e i nternational l egal concept o f reprisal i s analyzed,
examining how this concept fits into the coun ter-proliferation fram ework .
Although the international commun i ty generally denou nces p eacetime
m i l i tary reprisal s, the communi ty may n eed to reexam i n e thei r validity
in an era when the perceived d angers o f proli feration are i n creasing.
Chap ter VII s tudies counter-proliferation operations during war. Finally,
Chapter VI I I offers recommendations which the m em bers of the interna
ti onal community might consider as they address the threat of nuclear
proliferation . In ternational legal norms need to be reconsidered i f the
nonproliferation regi me is to meet its forthcomi ng challenges . The inter
national community mus t d ecide which is more critical, m ain taini ng the
existing international legal norm on self-defense, although th e problems
of proliferation will tax i t, or developing updated norms that wi ll address
proliferation concerns but which also might give nations greater license to
take otherwi se illegal offensive military action , thereb y challenging the
legitimacy of the U.N. Charter.

23

The Newport Papers
I n te rnati onal Law and Anti cipatory Se lf-Defense
The Definition of Self-Defense . Although seem ingly obvious, the defini
tion of sel f-defense is no t necessari ly clear. Self-defense, contrary to what
some might b elieve, is not designed to punish an aggressor. Punish ment
i s accomplished through repri sal, discussed below. Rather, as Richard J.
Erickson explains :
The purpose of self-defense is to preserve the status quo . . . . Self-de
fense does not seek the biblical eye for an eye; rather it seeks to preserve
world public order which is threatened b y perm itting the use of force
as an em ergenc y measure "strictly confined to the removal of the
danger." Thus, a nation acting in self-defense will apply force in a
restricted fashion that is regulated in scope and objective. Methods and
means, as well as targets, will be carefully selected to achieve the narrow
preventative purpose of self- defense
will not be directed in such a
manner as to be p un i tive in c haract er 6

ang
.

Unfortu nately, the line b etween that which i s defensive and that which
i s punitive i s rarely bright. Nations often frame puni tive a ctions i n the
guise of self-defense, and frequently the international com muni ty lab els
acts of self-d efense as puni tive b ecause the com muni ty tends to prefer the
61
avoidance of conflict to the implemen tation of i usti ce.
To reduce th i s
confusion, the history o f i n ternational law o n self-defense a n d i ts influence
in sh api ng current views on the accep tance of anticipatory self-defense
must be understood.

Customary lntenuztional Law: The Carolin e Case. Any discussion of a
right to antici patory self-defense should begin wi th an analysis o f the

Caroline case of 1 8 37.

62

This case involved a dispute b etween t he U ni ted

States and Great Bri tain over the activiti es of British forces in the Canadian
province of Ontario . An insurrection against B ritish rule had occurred in
Ontario, and Bri tish forces were attempting to eradi cate i t w hen an expe
ditionary patrol of the Bri ti sh army destroyed the privately owned U . S.

vessel Caroline, whi ch had been sup plying the rebels with arms, in the
Ameri can waters of Lake Ontario. The U ni ted S tates p rotes ted the British
action, and the British government defended i t on the ground that i ts forces
were acting in self-defense.

In 1 842, in a sub sequent di p lomatic exchange between the parties, U . S .

S ecretary o f State Daniel Webs ter enunciated a doctrine designed to
determi ne when an act of anti cipatory self-defense wou ld become accep t
able. Recent commentators observe :
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This fonnulation, known as the Caroline doctrine, asserts that use of
force by one nation against another is permissible as a self-defense
action only if force is both necessary and proportionate. The first of
these conditions, necessity, means that re sort to force in response to
an armed attack, or the imminent threat o f an armed attack, is allowed
only when an alternative means of redress is lack ing. The second
condition, proportionality, is linked closely to neces sity in requiring
that a use of force in self-d$fense must not exceed in manner or aim
the necessity provoking it.6

Th rough i n ternational accep tance of this standard, an ticipatory s elf-d e
fense became l egal i n certain lim ited circumstances . I n Webster's words,
the threat of a ttack had to b e "instan t, overwhelming, and l eaving no cho ice
.64
of means, and no moment for del iberation. '
For much of the n ineteenth and twentieth centuries the intern ational
legal regime accepted Web ster's test. If a nation reasonably believed that
an attack from an adversary was looming, i t could p reemp t that attack so
long as i ts use of force was reasonab le. However, th is standard was s ub j ect
to abuse. Nations often defended patently o ffensive military actions with
self-defense justifications. For example, the United States attributed i ts
decision to i nvade Mexico i n the 1 846 Mexican-Am erican War partially on
grounds of self-defense. This "self-defensive" action led to the an nexation
of the modern s tates of the U . S . Southwest, indud i ng Cali fornia.

The

League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. I n

the aftermath of

the First World War, the in ternational com mu n i ty sought to codify i n ter
national l aw on the use of fo rce. However, nei ther the 1 9 1 8 Covenant of
65
66
the League ofN ations nor the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1 928, which were
products of th es e efforts, altered the cus to mary i nternatio n al law on self
defense . Both mai n tained the cus tomary righ t, induding the righ t to
anticipatory self-defense when the threa t was imminent and the response
proportionate. While the League of Nations was d esigned to give nations
a forum i n which to discu ss their dispu tes, and the K el logg-Briand Pact
was designed to prohib i t resort to war " as an i nstrument of nati onal
.67
poli cy,'
nei ther document was designed to prevent states under duress
from takin g effective d efensive action to preemp t an advers ary's mili tary
aggression. Thus, through World War II, Web s ter's concep t ofan ti cip atory
self-defense survived. However, the language of the U.N. Charter has
clouded the con cep t's p reviou s clarity.
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The United Nations Charter
Article 5 1 . Much of the con troversy surrounding the right of a nation
to engage i n anticipatory self-defense centers on the language of Article 5 1

of the U.N. Charter, which s tates :
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individ ual or collective self-defense if an ann e d attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense
shall be immediately reponed to the Security Council and shall not in
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council
under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
·
68
secunty.

Two co nflicting vi ews of this language have p rovoked a debate regarding
69
One view holds that

a nation's righ t to act in anticipatory self-defense.

the language o f Article 5 1 must be read restri ctively, forbidding acts of

self-defense excep t after an actual arm ed attack. Proponents o f this view
maintain that permitting states to resort to force b efore an adversary's
attack would lead to errors in judgment, producing conflicts that otherwise
O
Funhermore, and taken to its extreme, this argument

might b e a voided

?

posits that once the Security Counci l takes "measures necessary to main
tain international peace and security," a

l!X acts of self-d efense, even if not

i ni tiated preemptively, must terminate. 1 Thus, according to the most
res trictive reading of Arti cl e 5 1 , on ce the Security Cou nci l takes action,

perhaps by imposing only limited economic sanctions, any continu ed
defensi ve action is i nvalid.
One illustration of how this interpretatio n would have applied is the

Security Council's respons e to the 1 990 I raqi invasion of Kuwait. Accord

ing to the most restrictive view, once the Securi ty Cou nci l passed reso lu
tions es tablis hing economic sanctions agains t I raq, "the Kuwai ti righ t to
resist no longer exis ted. Accordingly, Kuwait would b e forced to wai t and
see if the sanctions worked, or if the Security Council d ecided to take
additional [military] action .

.

.

. ,,72

Critics of this approach believe that th is view overstates the meaning of

Anicle 5 1 ,73 con tending that not only does the righ t to self-defens e extend

beyo nd th e initiation of action by the Securi ty Council, b u t also exists in
anticipation of an armed attack. Support for this argument derives from

the negotiating history (travaux preparatoires) of Article 5 1 , which does not
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purport to renounce th e prior cu stomary in terna tional l aw on self-de
14
fense. "The negotiating history a t the San Francisco Co n ference [which
estab lished the Uni ted Nations] reveals that Arti cle 5 1 was i ntended to
incorpora te th e entire customary law or 'in heren t right' of self-defense. The
comprehensive i n corporation of the customary l aw i n cludes reasonab le
and necessary anticipatory self-defense since th is has always b een a part of
7S
customary law.,,
Thus, the Charter must b e read i n ligh t of customary in ternational law
a t the tim e of i ts creation i n 1945 . This r eading suggests that the right to
s elf-defen se has remai ned virtually unchanged si nce Webster's formula
16
tion of the anticipatory self-defense standard i n the 1 84Os . The right to
anticipatory self-defense conti nues to exist so long as the a ctio n satisfies
the immi nence and proportionality requirem ents fi rst enunciated by Web 
s ter in the

Caroline

discussion s. I f overwhel m i ng evi dence exists that

demonstra tes an attack i s forthcomi ng, th en so long as preemptive action
is proportional to the threat, it should be l egal pursuant to international
law. The Uni ted S tates has adopted th is vi ew, b elievi ng that an ticipatory
self-defen se is perm issible at l east in certain con texts. I n 1 986, Secre tary of
S tate George P. Shul tz stated that a cou ntry is "permi tted to use force to
preempt future attacks, to seize terrorists, or to rescu e i ts ci tizens when no
77
oth er means are avai lab le.,,
Th e Advantages of Maintaining a Right to Anticipatory S elf-De
fense. While the U .N. Charter may or may no t limit the right to anticip a

tory self-defense, the option has not b een eliminated entirely. The prob lem
that would be created by an overly res trictive b an on anticipatory self-de

fense is that it would treat all cases, from i nvasions by insurgent guerrilla
78
forces to nuclear attacks , similarly.
I n an era of modern weaponry,
nations should not be compelled to awa i t a potenti ally devastating first
19
This is par

strike b efo re un dertaking l awful m easures of s elf-defense.

ticularly true in the case of a pendi ng nuclear attack wh en the po ten tial fo r
devastation is acute. As Beth Polebaum notes, "The Charter should not b e
read t o require one nation to permi t another th e b enefits o f mili tary
armament, surpri s e attack, and offensive advantage, agai nst which no
defense may lie. If th e Charter i s to b e an effective i nstrument, i t must be
80

read to accommodate the needs of the con temporary world .,,

The chall enge for th e international legal regi me is to create guidi ng
parameters in which a nation could take anticip atory defensive m easures
with the reasonable expectatio n that the international community would

accept them . However, this standard should not give na tions a carte blanche
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cast offensive actions in the legitimizing glow of self-defense. Discover

ing the prop er balance between these two extremes could prove daunting.

A Case Study in Co unte r- P rol ife rati on: Th e I s rael i De stnJ cti on
of the I raqi N uclear Reacto r Tam uz I
In an attempt to discover the elusive b alance permitting an ticip atory
self-defense in the nuclear age, one should study th e events of the most
notorious instance of counter-proliferation to date : the I sraeli attack on the
Iraqi nuclear facility known as Tamuz I near B aghdad in 1 98 1 . The
international community roun dly condemned th is attac k. Why? Which
elements of the attack made the Israeli government's self-defense jus tifi ca
tions unaccep table? Was the conclusion of the international community
made hastily? What lessons can these events offer regarding the require
ments of a legi timate counter-proliferation action b ased upon the theory
of anti cipatory self-defense? The destruction of the Iraqi reactor offers

valuable lessons for U . S . policy m akers as they consider the d evelop ment
of U . S . counter-proliferation poli cy.

The Facts. On Sunday, 7 June 1 98 1 , eigh t Israeli F- 1 6 fighter planes
manufactured in the United States bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor under
construction near Baghdad. "The bombs were deposited with impressive
Sl
The Israeli

precis ion, and within two minutes the reactor was des troyed."

go vernment, led by Prime Minister Menach em Begin, justified its action
on the b asis of self-defense. 8 2 In support of its position, the Israeli govern

ment claimed that " [s]ources of unquestio ned reliability told us that [the
reactor] was intended . . . for the production of atomic bomb s . The goal of
83
these bombs was Israel .,,
The construction of the Iraqi reactor, undertaken with the assistance of
French and I talian technicians, had co ncerned the internation al commu
nity prior to the Israeli attack. In 1 9 80, Iran had attemp ted to destroy the
84
facility during its war with I raq. Th e reactor's ability to p roduce weap 
85
ons-grade fissionab le material also concerned the United S tates .
Israel conducted the raid secretly, not informing the United S tates or
86
any of its other alli es of the attack until its completion.
This l ack of
information led the Reagan administration to suspend delivery of four
87
F- 1 6s which Israel h ad previously purchased fro m the United S tates.

International Reaction. International reaction to the d aring Isra eli raid
was swift and overwhelmingl y negative. The United S tates, France, the
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Arab states and the Soviet Uni on condemned the attack as a violation of
88
international law.
Kurt Wal dheim, Secretary General of the U nited
Nations, stated on the day followi ng the raid th at it was " [a] clear con tra
89
vention o f i n ternational law.,, On 1 9 Jun e 1 98 1 , th e Secu ri ty Cou ncil, in
Reso lution 487, condem ned the raid and ordered Israel to make reparations
90
to Iraq for the latter's 10sses . The United States ab stained w hen this vote
91
The internation al communi ty rej ected I sraeli arguments that
occurred.
92
the strike was an act of self-defense.
Th e in tern ational communi ty also was concerned that the raid would
weaken the nonpro liferation regi me. The raid sugges ted that despite a
93
nation's acquiescence to IAEA safeguards, its nuclear faci lities s till migh t
94
b e sub j ec t t o a n armed attack.
Members o f the U .S . Senate, who were
con cerned about the future of the nonproliferation regime, made simi lar
9S

argum ents .

Why Not Self-Defense. The international rejection o f th e Israeli argument

that the attack against the Tamuz I reactor was an act of self-defense
6
requires further analysis
Which element of th e requirements for a

?

legitimate exercise o f anticipatory self-defen se did Israel fail to satisfy?
Alternativel y, did th e Israelis meet these requ i rements only to discover that
the members of the i nternational community chose to focus on external
po litical considerations, such as Israe l's isolated s tatus in the world com 
munity, to justify their condemnation ?

Imminence of Attack by Iraq. O ne of the ch ief weaknesses of the Israeli
defense claim was the fact that mos t of the in ternational community
b elieved that I raq was years away from d eveloping a nu cl ear warhead.

9

Conse uently, an I raqi nuclear attack against Israel could not be immi
9
nen t. Accord ingly, th e Israelis failed to pass the imminence requirement
of the anticipatory s el f-defense tes t, as "[t] here is no legal authori ty em

�

powerin a s tate to employ coercion against a speculative or non-i mminent
However, the Israeli claim that circumstan ces d i ctated early
th reat."
des truction of the faci lity has some meri t. The Israelis attacked the reactor
b efore it went "critical," when nuclear material would be on s i te. The
Israelis believed that this event would h ave o ccurred i n the summer of

1 98 1 . A later attack wou ld have risked the release of fissionable m aterial,
possibly sp reading radiation over a wi d e area. Thus, accord i ng to the
Israelis, for all intents and purposes, they were imminently subject to a
nonnuclear attack by I raq, and even if this were not the case, to h ave wai ted
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until the reac tor commenced production o f nuclear fuel would have b een
irresponsible for both national security and environmental reas ons .99

The Raid Did Not Respond to an Illegal Iraqi Activity. The next fac tor

militati ng against justification of th e Israeli attack is the fact that most o f

t h e international community b elieved that Iraq was in compliance wi th i ts
i nternational l egal ob ligations, including IAEA safeguards . l OO The pre

sumption th at the Iraqi nuclear program was l eg al and safeguarded meant
that the Israeli action was not defensive, but punitive.

The prob lem with this analysis is that Israeli intel ligence had concluded

that the Iraqis were in violation of their international accords and that the

Iraqi government was committed to the clandes tine development of a

nuclear warhead. WI Given the traditio n of tense relations b etween Israel
1
and I raq, 02 the Israelis fel t compelled to take action b ased upon thei r b elief
that Iraq was dedicated to constructing nucl ear weapons.

Israel Failed to Exhaust Diplomacy. The strongest argument j ustifyi ng

condemnation of the Israeli action was the fact that Israel failed to exh au s t
diplomatic channels in an attempt to solve its security con cerns prior to

taking military action. 103 For exampl e, Israel did not notify th e Uni ted

S tates of i ts inten tio n to strike th e reactor. 104 No r did the Is raelis attempt

to convince the French and I talian

overnments of the need to augment
� 5
safeguards at the Tamuz I facility. 0 Finally, Israel did not take i ts
complaint to the United Nations for a hearing on the matter. Hence, I srael

may have resorted to mil i tary action prematurely.

The Israelis could have demonstrated more patience. However, they also

faced multiple di lemmas on the diplomatic front. First a new French
} 6
government had taken power only weeks befo re the raid. 0 Its ability to

persuade the Iraqis to halt their program was ques ti onabl e at b es t; only
days b efore the attack, French Foreign Minister Claude Chepson had
declared that, while not likely to engage in future nucl ear programs with

Iraq, the new French government would fulfill its predecessor's obliga
tions . i 0 7 Moreover, given the historic b i as against Israel in the U ni ted
Nations, taking its case to that multinational b ody did not seem a reason

able alternative for the Israeli regi me. Whil e the United S tates may have
been able to make d i plomatic efforts with the govern m ent in B aghdad,

its influence p robab ly wou ld have b een minimal . Final ly, di plom acy
takes time to accomplish its obj ectives. Lengthy dip lomatic discussions

would hav e given the Iraqis more time to complete the reactor, p erhaps

even allowing them to bring fissionable material to th e s i te. Exhausting
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diplomatic li nes might have proven disastrous for the Israelis if negotia
tions had failed. The Iraqis would have bought time for th eir nuclear
program while placating the international community.
Proportionality. I nternational law required that the Israelis take action
in proportion to the threat against them when they engaged in their attack.
108
In Poleb aum's
The extent of the Israeli strike satisfied this requirement.
succinct evaluation : " [Israel] employed conven tional weapons and d e
stroyed only the reactor capable of producing nuclear bombs . . . . Baghdad
was unharmed. Israel carried out the strike on a Sunday, when the reactor
was presumab ly vacant, to ensure the safety of the French and Arab
109
workers.,,
Had Israel possessed a less destructive means to accomplish
its mission effectively, in ternational law would have compelled it to try
that method . This concept dictates that a mission of self-defense may
incorpora te only the minimal amoun t of force necessary to accomplish its
goals. However, i t is unclear by what standard o ne should measure such
force. Should the standard be based on the number of casualties, the extent
of the destruction, the amount of force employed, or some combi nation
thereof? Presumably, the predominant goal of this standard is to limit
casualties. Yet the amount of force employed does not necessarily corre
spond to the extent of casualties, as precisely guided, powerful munitions
may cause fewer casual ties than a less powerful weapon aimed erratically.
110
The Israeli action caused little collateral damage and few casual ties.,,

The Lessons from the Destruction of Tamuz I. The Israeli raid offers
numerous lessons applicable to the counter-proli feration debate. However,
the political status of Israel i n the international community in the early
1980s may dilute their value, as it is u nknown wh ether the international
communi ty would apply the same standard to another nation. Despit e this
caveat, the raid and i ts subsequent discussion may lead us to posit that
self-defense will fail as a justification of a counter-proliferation activity if
it neglects any part of a rigorous legal standard. An attacker mus t satisfy
the four elements of the anticipatory self-defense test. First, the counter
proliferation attack must corne in anticipation of an imminent attack by
an adversary. Second, the potential proliferant must violate some aspect of
international law, whether it be the N Yf or some other international norm .
Third, the nation considering a counter-proliferation assaul t must exhaust
all reasonable diplomatic efforts before commencing mili tary action. And
fourth, the counter-proliferation event, when i t does occur, must be
proportionate to the threat produced by the potentia l proliferation; the
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mi litary force employed should not exceed the minimum amount neces
sary to accomplish the counter-proliferation task, as excessive force violates
international law.
Any nation con templating a counter-proliferation action should not
only unders tand it wi l l be difficult to meet the anticipatory self-defense
standards but also realize that it will prove diffi cult to convince the
memb ers of the in tern ation al commun i ty tha t its action actual ly has passed
that test. In other words, since in ternation al pol itics is a largely subj ective
arena, the attacker must not only pass th e self-defense test, it also must
prove it has passed. The attacker b ears the burden of proof in such
situations. " [T] he world communi ty is likely to hold the acting state to a
high standard i f the in ternational reaction to th e Israeli raid on the Iraqi
UI
Osirak [Tamuz I] nuclear reactor is any indication ."
The Israeli action
arguably fulfilled all the requi rem en ts of the an ti cipatory sel f-defense
stan dard, yet friend and foe alike con demned the action. Thus, drawing
upon what admittedly is a l ess than perfect example, in order for a state to
justify i ts counter-proliferation activity to a skeptical world community,
its evidence must prove cl ear and convincing.
Another lesson one should take from the inciden t is that although a
coun ter-proliferation strike may have high in ternational legal costs, the
price might be worth paying. Th e Israeli attack set back the I raqi nuclear
program ; however, subsequ ent even ts demonstrated Baghdad's determi
nation to build nucl ear weapons . But for the attack on the reactor, I raq
might have been able to construct a warhead by the mid- 1 9 80s. Israel could
not have accepted this possibility, yet it is unclear w hether the Israeli
government could have prevented Iraqi development of a warhead any later
than 1 98 1 , especially if the reactor had gone cri tical. Thus, although the
in ternational community con demned Israel for an osten sibly illegal act, it
is unlikely that I srael regrets the attack. Moreover, it is apparen t that m any
other n ations, i ncluding the United States, do not regret the I sraeli attack .
For examp l e, in 1 99 1 , U .S . S ecretary of D efens e Richard Cheney publicly
1 12

thanked the Israelis for thei r "bold and dramatic action .,,

The Ability of the U n ited State s to Ju stify Counter-Proliferati on on th e
T h e o ry o f AntiCi patory Self- D efe nse
I f the U nited States were to engage in counter-proliferation measures, it
might attempt to justify i ts action on the basis of anticipatory self-defense.
Would the United S tates be ab le to sustain th is argument, or would it face
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the same type of condemnation which Israel endured after its attack on
Tamuz I ? Inevitable obstacles would face the United States if i t were to
defend its counter-proliferation action on this basis. These barriers corre
spond to the requirements needed to justify any anticipatory action of
self-defense. A failure to satisfy any of these criteria would make the action
illegal pursuant to present norms of i nternational law.
While evaluating the legality of any U .S. deploymen t of the counter-pro
li feration strategy depends somewhat upon unique circumstances, one may
make a few assumptions regarding U . S. positions in a scenario in which it
felt compelled to resort to the policy in its most violent form. The first
assumption is that, at least for the foreseeable future, the United States will
possess the more powerful military arsenal vis-a-vis any potential prolifer
ant. Another assumption is that the U nited States would attempt to utilize
the authority of the United Nations, at least initially, in order to support
its action. Fi nally, given the principles of U.S. mi litary strategy, the United
States would employ substantial force to accomplish its counter-prolifera
tion objectives. Redundancy is a hallmark of U.S. military tactics. The
tactics employed during "'Operation Desert Storm" demonstrated this
tendency, as t he U . S.-led coalition conducted over 1 00,000 ai r sorti es
1 l3
The United States is unlikely to abandon this practice in
against Iraq.
any foreseeable counter-proliferation scenario.

Th2 Immediacy Requirement. The immediacy requ irement poses an in
stant and severe threat to any U.S. justification of a counter-proliferation
activi ty based upon the theory of anticipatory self-defense. With the end
of the Cold War, the risk to the United States from nuclear attack has been
4
None of the usual proliferation suspects currently have the

reduced

y

capacity to strike the Uni ted States.

1 IS

Even t h e most pessimistic estimates

believe that another decade will pass before a nation currently hosti le to

p

U.S. interests will have the ca acity to strike the United States with a
nuclear-tipped ballistic missile.

16

Consequently, the U nited States would

have difficulty meeting t he first condition of the anticipatory self-defense
test.
The U nited States might argue that although these states cannot place
the U nited States at imminent risk of nuclear attack, they might be able to
threaten both U . S . allies and U . S . military forces deployed overseas. Thus,
according to this reasoning, the counter-proliferation event could meet the
immediacy requirement. Two problems confront this argument. First,
while U.S. forces may be deployed overseas, thei r presence does not convert
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the land which they occupy into V . S . terri tory. A significant difference
exists b etween defending V . S . territory and U . S . forces, as the former
repres ents an elemen t of U . S . sovereignty, while forces deployed overs eas
do not, in and of themselves, co mmand the same degree oflegal protection.
Second, if an i mminent threat exi s ted against an ally of the U ni ted States,
that might give th e al ly a justification to engage in a coun ter-pro liferatio n
strike, but prob ably would not permit the United S tates to undertake the
operatio n unilaterally.
For example, to attempt to justify a preemptive attack aga inst North
Korea's nuclear faci Ii ti es, the V ni ted S tates would have to d emons trate that
its coun ter-proliferation action had m et two aspects of the immediacy tes t.
First, V . S. leaders would have to es tab lish that the North Koreans were o n
the verge o f developing a nuc lear warhead and that the counter-prolifera
tion activity had to be conducted immediately to be effective. More i mpor
tantly, the United States would have to d emo nstrate that if North Korea
were p ermi tted to d evelop its bomb, it could and would immediately attack
the United S tates (an admittedly unlikely scenario ), South Korea, or Japan.
The United S tates cou ld argue that the coun ter-proliferation campaign
was co nducted no t for the defense o f the U n i ted S tates, but for the defense
of Sou th Korea and American forces located there. However, as noted
above, th ese facts might l egiti mize a preemptive attack by the South
Koreans, but might not suffice to justify unilateral Ameri can action . A
combined U . S.-South Korean attack might pass muster, but the interna
tional commu nity likely wou ld scrutinize any U . S . involvemen t clo sely.

Any

U.S. A ction Must Respond to an Illegal A ctivity.

To engage legally

in an act of counter-proliferation, th e Uni ted S tates must demons trate that
the target state is in b reach of som e aspect of i n ternational law. This
requirement is met most easi ly w hen a state i s clandes tin ely develop i ng a
nuclear warhead i n violation of i ts commitment to the NPT. However, if
the state is not an NPT member, or if it has withdrawn from the regi me

pursuant to i ts rights under Article X of the Treaty, 1 1 7 then the Uni ted

States would n eed to b ase its co un ter-p roliferation activi ty on some broader
concept found wi thi n the body of cus tomary international law. According
to one o fficial, the U.S. Departmen t of Defense takes the po sition that an
internatio nal norm exists which classifies the developmen t of a nuclear

�

wea on by a previously nonnuclear state as a violation of international

8
law. 1 This theory of i n ternational law, however, migh t be unconvincing

to an i nternatio nal community that p erceives a reluctance on the part of
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the current nucl ear powers to reduce thei r arsenals and which has ignored
the proliferation of nuclear weapo ns in non·NPT memb ers such as Israel
and India. Even if the in tern ational community has accep ted thi s norm,
the communi ty has n ot cons tructed an effective enforcemen t regi me which
guaran tees adherence to i t.
In other words, vi ola tions of in ternational law are rarely obvious. The
United States might have to procure a reso lution from the Securi ty Coun cil
condemni ng the proliferation activity as a b reach of in ternational law to
justify this element of the preemp tiv e self·defense test . Such condemnation
might be difficult to obtain and would not occur rapi dly.

Obligation to Exhaust Diplomatic Options . The third obstacle which the
United S tates mu st overcome to justify a preemptive counter·proliferation
attack i s the requirement to demonstrate th at it had exhausted all reason
able diplomatic av enu es b efore engaging in mi litary action. This condition
would prove easier to hurdle i f the s tate in question completely refused to
negotiate the prol ifera tion issue. However, even the mos t reclusive pariah
state normally does not completely isolate i tself fro m the interna tional
community. Recen t events involving North Korea d emons trate this point.
If n egotiations were ongoing but failing to make progress, then the U ni ted
S tates might be ab le to argue that the po ten tial proliferan t was engagi ng in
s tonewalling tactics to delay the i nevi tab le. Unfortunately, i t is often
difficu l t to discern when n egotiations have failed and when they are merely
stalled.
The diplomatic exhaus tion requirement is not easily fulfilled. Given the
prominent posi tion of th e United States in the international community,
i t might prove substantial ly more difficult for the U nited States to meet
this requiremen t than for states of lesser i nternati onal stature.

The Proportionality Requirement. The final requirement that the test for
preemptive s elf·defense i mposes upon a state engaging in a coun ter·prolif·
erati on attack is that i t use no more force than n ecessary to accomplish i ts
mission . This requ irement, which seems only reaso nable in di plomati c
circles, is not n eces sari ly consi s tent wi th current U.S. mili tary dogma.
When the Uni ted S tates employs fo rce, it often does so redu ndantly. In
other words, th e United States tends to apply more force than the mini
mum necessary to guarantee that i t accomplishes i ts military ob jectives.
For example, in the Persian Gulf conflict, " [t]he Pen tagon exp lai ned i ts
strategy as applying overwhel ming force at maximum efficiency. Co alition
leaders were in tent on achieving their ob jecti ves wi th minimum Co alition
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casualties and maximum combat effici e ncy. If co mbat op erations became
1 19
necessary, the co ncep t was to apply overwhelmi ng fo rce.,,
From a
military perspective this strategy is sensible, b ecause a military failure often
is worse than not attempti ng to accomplish the mission in the first place.
However, the use of "overwhelming" force to attain a military objective can
crea te problems for the United Sta tes within th e i nternational com munity.
In the context of anticipatory sel f-defense, it could be though t to violate
i nternational law.
U .S. military capab ilities might assist in the fulfillment of the require
ment, as the imposi tion of more force does no t lead invariab ly to more
destructio n . Precis ion-guided mu nitions, for example, could destroy the
target without causing extensive d amage to the surrounding area. The
i nternational l egal standard for p roportionality is unclear in this regard.
Does the standard prevent overwhelming force or overwhelming damage?
If the use of disproportionate force does not result in disp roportionate
destruction, then the Uni ted States might b e able to satisfy this require
ment.

A co ndition related to the proportionality requi remen t co nsiders the
type of force applied in a given situatio n . The degree of force should not
exceed the minimum necessary to accomplish the desired task. In o ther
words, if the U nited States could reaso nably expect to employ a successful
nonviolent counter-proliferatio n approach, by th e stan dards of interna
tional l aw it must attempt to do so b efore engaging in a violent attack. Thus
this argu ment holds that, if possib l e, the Uni ted S tates should attempt to
sabotage the weapo n s program of a proliferant through th e introduction of
a computer virus, for example, b efore bombing the proliferant's weapons
development facilities .

Conclusions Regarding t h e Legality o f Cou nte r-Pro l i fe rati o n P u rsuant
to the I nte rnational Law of Anticipato ry S e lf- Defen s e
The requi rements a state must satisfy to justify a n act of anticip atory
self-defense are stri ngent. They s eek to preven t states from disguising
unn ecessary and illegitimate mi litary attacks as acts of self-defense. The
United S tates would face a dau nting task to convince the i nternational
communi ty that a violent act of cou nter-proli feration fell squarely withi n
the legal requirements of the test for antici patory s elf-defense. I t is di ffi cult
to imagine many states accep ti ng U .S. explan atio ns that i t was under the
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threat of imminent attack by a Third World s tate producing i ts first nuclear
weapon.
Beyond the i mminence requirement lie the o ther requirements o f
preemptive self-defense. When examined collectively, they make i t diffi
cult to fathom how the Uni ted States could legally justify a coun ter-prolif
eration activity on the basis of anticipatory self-defense. This legal
conclusion, however, should not (and will not) be the only factor U . S .
leaders consider when deciding whether t o engage i n a n act of counter-p ro
liferation. The international community condemned Israel for i ts attack o f
Tamuz 1 . 1 20 However, in retrospect, it is doub tful that the government o f
Israel or other members of t h e in ternational community regret that at
121
tack.
As Prime Minister Menachem Begin declared, "Despite all the
condemnations in the last twenty- four hours, Israel has nothing to apolo

gize for. It was a just cause. And it shall yet triumph ; . . . it was an act o f
1 22
supreme moral and national self-defense.,,
T h e legal analysis, therefore,
should not be dispositive when analyzing the counter-proliferation equa

tion . Like Menach em B egin in 1 98 1 , U .S. leaders must determi ne whether
the condemnation of the i n ternational communi ty is a cos t worth bearing
to prevent a nation from going nuclear.
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VJ[
Cou nte r- P ro l ife ration and the Co ncept of Reprisa l

lTF COUNTER-PROLIFERATION is unlikely to meet the requirements of
Jl anticipatory self-defense, then wha t other l egal concept might describe
a counter-proliferation even t? Counter-proliferation perhaps b est fits un
1 23
der the rubric of the i nternational l egal concep t o f reprisal .
However,
wh ile an act of cou nter-proliferati o n might fit within the defini tion of
reprisal, this fact does not solve the p rob lem for a s tate engaging i n that

act, for reprisals are per se illegal pursuant to current norms of in ternation al
law.

The Legal Defi nition of an Act of Re prisal
While rep risal and self-defense are related co ncepts, since both are forms

of self-help, reprisals differ from self-defense because the former are puni
tive. As Derek Bowett explains :

The difference between {he two forms of s elf-help lies ess entially in
their aim or purpose. Self defense is permissible for the purpose of
protecting the security o fthe state and the essential rights-in particu
lar the rights o f territorial integrity and political independence upon
which that security depen d s In contrast, reprisals are punitive in
character: they seek to impose reparation for the harm done, or to
compel a satisfactory settlement o f the d ispute created b y the i n itial
illegal act, or to compel the delinquent state to abide b y the law in the
124
future.
.
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I t is th ei r puni tive nature that preclu des the legitimacy of reprisals
before international law. They co nflict wi th the language of articles

2(3 )

and 2(4) of the U . N . Charter, which requires that s tates settle their disputes
by peaceful means and refrain from the use or threat of the use of force
agains t o ther s tates. Thus, one com mentator explains : "The general view
is that articles 2 ( 3 ) and 2(4) of the U .N. Charter have ou tlawed peacetime

reprisals. U . N . General Assemb ly resolutions have called on s tates to
1 25
refrai n from i ts [sic] use.,,

The prohibition agai nst p eaceti me reprisals reflec ts the in ternational
co mmu nity's d esire to avoid conflict between states despite the possible
legi timacy of a claim by one state agai nst another. The hop e o f the fou n ders
of the Uni ted Nations was that disputing parties would b ri ng their claims
to ei ther the U . N. S ecuri ty Council or the I nternational Court of Justice
for peaceful settlement i nstead o f engaging in des tructive m i li tary opera
126
tions to settle the score.
To further this aspiration, the language of the
Charter i mplicitly forbids the use of reprisals .
Five reaso ns are commonly given to exp lai n the general co ndem natio n
of repri sals . As Ri chard

J.

Erickson s tates, " First, forcible reprisal is a

remedy available o nly to the s trong over the weak. S econd, i t allows the
i njured s tate to both ju dge the wrong done against it and ex tract the
reparation for that wrong. T hird, reprisals con note an eye fo r an eye,
revenge, and retaliation . Four th, reprisals tend to embi tter relations am ong
s tates . Fifth, reprisals can result in counter-reprisals and escalatio n of the
1 27
use of force between states.,,
The tes t to d etermi ne whether a mi li tary s trike qualifies as a reprisal
.
1 28
'
. 1 en t
F lrst, N a non
'
X mus t commI t a nonVIO

. s th ree e I emen ts.
con tam

wrong agai nst the i nteres ts of Nation Y. Seco nd, N atio n Y must respo nd

to this vio lation of i ts interest and i nternational law by taki ng military

action agai nst Nation X to pu nis h Nation X for i ts unlawful act and to have

Na tion X change its behavio r. Third, Nation V's military action mus t not
fi t within the accep tab le legal definition o f the right of self-defense.

Counte r- Proliferation and Reprisals
Any counter-proliferation activity conducted by the United S tates al
mos t certainly would fal l within the legal definition of reprisal. The s tri k e
would meet t h e three requirements s e t forth i n t h e reprisal defi nition.
First, the U ni ted S tates would p erceiv e a legal wro ng to i ts in teres ts, i n this
case a violation of the putative norm against proliferation. S econd, by
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employing military force the United States would attempt to coerce the
target state to modify i ts policy. Finally, for the reasons ou tlin ed abov e, the
U . S . action wou ld not fit wi th in the confines of th e definition of a state
undertaking an act of p reemptive s elf-defense.

The Violation of International Law by the Target Stare . The situation in
North Korea, despit e the recent agreement wi th the U ni ted States and
South Korea, provides a good example of how this a nalysis might apply. If
the goal of i ts nuclear program were to cons truct a warhead, then North
Korea wou ld be in violation of i ts international treaty commitmen ts by

b reach ing the N]7f. Even i f North Korea were to withdraw from the NPT,
i ts d evelopment of a nuclear warhead conceivably would violate a p re

sumed i n ternational l egal norm prohibi ting the p rolifera tion of nu clear
weapon s . Thus, the developm ent program, as a

prima facie

violation of

international law, would satis fy the firs t stipulation of the reprisal test.

The Response to the Violation . It is possible that in response to th e alleged
North Korean violatio n, th e United States, unab le to ob tain the results it
desires diplomaticall y and unable to convince the Chinese, for example, of
the n eed for multilateral economic sanctions against North Korea, would
conclude that it mu s t take effective action to pun ish the North Koreans fo r

their v iolations of both the NYf and the nonproli feration norm . Thus, the
United S tates wou ld attack those facil i ti es wh i ch i t believed were an

integral part of the North Korean weapons development program .
The United S tates could support its action by e mploying two justifica
tions. First, the Uni ted S tates could note th at a North Korea in possession

of a nuclear warhead would have posed an unacceptable threat to South
Korea, Japan, and to American forces deployed throughout Asia. S econ d,
the United S tates could assert t hat its attack wi ll deter o ther potenti al
proliferants from continuing thei r weapon s development p rograms. Thes e
other nations, in effect, should learn the lesson that the United S tates wil l
n o t tolerate nuclear proliferation and punishes thos e s tates t h a t fai l t o heed

thei r com mi tments to the NPT an d to the i n ternational no rm agai ns t

proliferatio n. In this s cenario, the counter-proliferation event passes the
pu nishmen t element of the test for reprisal.

The

Concept of Reprisal 1JeTsus the Concept of Self-Defense.

While the

Uni ted S tates could argue that i t conducted i ts cou n ter-p roliferatio n activ
i ty to defend U . S . forces deployed ab road, that argu ment is unlikely to
succee d in classifying the action as one of self-defense for the reasons
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outlined in Chapter V above. I n these circums tances, the third stipulation
of the tes t would be satisfied, and the U nited States would have co mmitted
an act of repri sal. In o ther words, the U n i ted States would have violated
current international law and undermined its position wi thin the interna
tional community. The United States might be willing to accept som e
international condemnation if it b el ieved that the danger represented by a

North Korean bomb was intolerab le. U.S. policy makers may have to make
that decision, but they should no t d elib erate under the illusion that,

pursuant to current law, the international community wil l accep t the
legality of the decision . Perhaps if the U nited States were ab le to form a

multi lateral coali tion, the action might be legitimate pursuant to article 42

or arti cle 5 2 of the U .N. Charter; 1 29 however, as noted previously, forming
multilateral coali tions to take preemptive action is not an easy task.

An Exception to the R e p risal P rohibiti on i n
O rde r t o Com b at P rol ife rati o n ?
This analysis therefore finds that a n a c t of counter-proliferatio n woul d
violate current provisions of internatio nal law. However, i t should not
necessarily be con cluded tha t the United States should abandon the

counter-proliferation s trate gy. The time m ay have arrived for the i nterna

tional community to carve out an ex cep tio n to th e prohib i tion against

reprisals in order to combat th e proliferation of weapons of mass destruc
tion. Multiple argumen ts in favo r of the creation of such an exception exist.
However, strong arguments against the estab lishment of an exception also
exist. Both sides of the deb ate need to be examin ed.

Arguments in Favor of an Exception. Three arguments favor the creation
of a reprisal exception. First, the destructive power of nuclear weapons
makes their development a far greater threat to international peace and
security than any other potenti al tra nsgressi o n of i nternational l aw. The
international community needs radi cal solutions to prevent s tates from

acquiring these devi ces . Ob taining an effective in te rn ati o na l consensus
that resolves the prob lem of proliferation has proven difficult i n the past
and is unlikely to b eco m e any easier in the near future. Thus, to preserve
the no rm a gai n st proliferation, it is i mp or tant to give s tates greater leeway
to take reprisals against t hose states i llicitly developing nucl ear warheads.
S eco nd, th e international legal norms developed in the aftermath of
World War II do not adequately address the chal lenges of th e New World
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O rder. In an era when fears of rampant proliferation are promi nent, the
tim e has arrived to reconsider the international preference for the absence

of conflict over jus tice. 1 30 If nonproliferation provides the only j ustifiab le
course of the international community, then i ts memb ers must have the
requisite tools to combat the thr eat of the illicit acquisi tion of nuclear

weapons . 1 3 I Counter-proliferation, the argum ent runs, rep resen ts the mos t
effective tool to combat the spread of these weapons.
Thir d, while reprisals may b e illegal pursuant to intemational law, they
2
do occur
In fact, the international com muni ty frequently fails to con

.B

demn them. Anthony Clark Arend observes that :
[W]hile states are formally unwilling to depart from the Charter
paradigm, in j ustifying their actions they have expanded the notion of
sel f-de fense to include deterrence and even punishment. S uch a broad
ened notion of self-defense, while perhaps politic ally and even morally
commendable, seems to be clearly at variance with the Charter's ideal
133
of peace over iustice.

Perhaps it is time to ad mit that the norm against reprisals has b ecome
archaic and that the internatio nal community should fashion an updated
norm, which recognizes that repri sals have b ecome accepted

de facto,

perm itti ng limited reprisals against the most d angerous prol iferants.

Arguments against an Exception. The arguments against estab lishing an
exception to the reprisal prohibition h i nge on the traditional reasoning
that it wo uld lead to an explosion of uncheck ed violence throughou t the
world. Accord ing to this posi tion, it would be imposs i ble to limit an
exception to the nonproliferation context. Maintaining the current in ter
national law on reprisals is preferable to crea ting the inevitable "sli ppery
slope" that an excep tion would produce, and the costs of estab lishing a
reprisal exception greatly exceed any potential b enefi ts . An ex ception
would create a license to com mit violence and wou ld discriminate against
the weaker s tates of the international com muni ty.
This argument also posits that despi te the meri ts of a coun ter-proli fera
tion strategy, it is inherently imperialistic. Establishi ng an excep tion fo r
reprisals against proliferation would co ndone such imperialis m. An excep
tion would create a tool o nly for the s tro ng and would violat e the rights of
weaker Third World nations . Furth ermore, an exception would contai n an
element of hypocrisy, as those s tates calli ng for i ts creation would b e the
very s tates that cu rren tly possess nuclear arsenals or whi ch are allied to the
nuclear powers .
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The creation of an exception also would underm ine the current nonpro
liferation regime that it seeks to protect. The exception would demonstrate
that the goals of the NPf had failed, and would show that the nuclear-weap

ons s tates have beco me unwilling to satisfy their treaty commitments. This
might cause the collapse of the nonproliferatio n regime, leading s tates to

deny inspection rights to the !AEA . S tates might feel compelled to place
their nuc lear programs underground, both Ii terally and figu ratively, where
they would be safer from attack.
On a more cynical note, the United S tates may desire th at these types of
reprisals remain legally unacceptab le, and yet conduct them nonetheless,
reasoning that the gain from preventing the potential proliferant from
obtaining a nuclear warhead dram atically outweighs the political toll
incurred for violating the reprisal prohibition. The prohib ition against
reprisals would be sustained, theoretically preventing other states, which
may possess interests adv erse to those of the United S tates, from e ngaging
in similar acts . In essence, the United States, like Israel before it, would
accept co ndemnation as a type of internatio nal "cost of doing business" in
an attempt to have i t both ways, maintai ning the norms against both
proliferation and rep risal.

Conclusions on Self-Defense and Reprisal
The previous section s have classified coun ter-proliferation within the
framework of international law on s elf-defense and reprisal, concluding
that the United States would have difficulty justifying an act of counter
proliferation on the b asis of anticipatory self-defense. T he requirements of
anticipatory self-defense are too arduous for a cou nter-proliferation strike
to meet. Counter-proliferatio n fits more readily into the framework of
reprisal. However, under current international law, reprisals are illegal.
Consequently, if the United States wants to pursue this strategy, it mus t
either choose to vio late current i nternational law or convince the i nterna
tional communi ty that the time has come to change the legal norm agai nst
reprisal in order to supply that com munity with another instrument i n i ts
ongoing campaign against nuclear proliferation.

44

Cou nte r- P roliferation a nd Wa r

HE
T

PREVIOUS SECTIONS

of this study have concen trated on the use of

cou nter-proliferation measures as a tool to prevent the acquisition o f

nuclear weapons b efore the outb reak o f war between a state developing a
nuclear weapon and those opposed to that produ ction. This section focuses

on the problem during a time of war. 134 To wha t ex ten t are coun ter-pro
liferation efforts acceptable in th e wartime setting? This ques tio n grew in

i mportance with the recent review of U . S . war plans i n preparation for the

possible outbreak of hostilities wi th North Korea. 1 35

The Clin ton administration is studying questions surrounding counter

proliferation in other regions as weB, "ordering regional comm an ders to

develop detailed plans for thwarting p roliferation threats i n their areas,

among other measures.,,1 36 For example, i n the even t of a conflict between

the United S tates and Iran, U.S. military officials will need to address the

Iranian weapons development p rogram. The issue of wha t action to take

agai nst nuclear faciIi ties in a time of war also could occur i f a second conflict

with Iraq were to break out . The United S ta tes, u nder the auspices of the
United Nations, showed little reluctance during the 199 1 Gulf War in

s triking the I raqi nuclear program. Would the U nited States, acting alone

or as part of a U.N. -sanctioned coalition, be justified in attacking Iraq's
nuclear program a second time?

The pages that follow explore these questions from a legal perspective,

concen trating on lessons drawn from three sources : customary i n terna

tional law, international accords on the law of armed conflict, and the
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precedent of earlier conflicts . Unlike the previous sections o f this study,
which focused on international law regarding resort to the use of force (jus

ad bellum), this section centers on the legal ramifications of the use of
counter-proliferation measures during a time of war. Thus, an under
standing of the laws of war (jus in bello), which limit the permissible military
activities offorces embroiled i n comb at, is crucial. The Hague Convention
138
137
and the 1 977 Additional
of 1 907,
the Geneva Conventions of 1 949,
1 39
Protocols to these Conv entions
are particularly importan t, for these
documents provide the most comprehensive representatio n of the current
state of thinking regarding the laws of war.
These legal issues merit dis cussion because the United S tates depends
on the international legal regi me during periods of both peace and w ar. If
the United States were to become embroiled in hostilities which required
the use of counter-proliferations methods, it would want to conduct those
efforts within the framework of the laws of war to maintain favorable
standing within the international community. A wartime counter-prolif
eration endeavor would be far more likely to receive b road international

support if the U ni ted States were to follow the requirements of the laws of
1 40
war th an 1' f 11
' were to VIO I ate t h ese norms.
.

The

Customary Laws of War

The core legal principles which address th e acceptability of attacks
against military targets u nder the traditional laws of war have developed
gradually over the centuries. However, through multilateral accords on the
laws of war, the international community, particularly since the conclusion
of World War II, has narrowed the range of targets legally subject to attack .
Thus, while the b asic test to determine the legality of attacks has remained
essentially the same, the list of types of targets passing that standard has
dwindled in an attempt to prevent civilian casualties.
Necessity. A two-part test identifies the requisite characteristics a target
must possess before a belligerent may attack it. First, the target mus t
possess some military value. The customary international l aws of war, as
well as subsequ ent international conventions, prohibit attacks against
targets po ssessing li ttle or no military value. For example, indiscriminate
141
attacks against civilian populations are forbidden.
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The test to determine wh ether an objecti ve is a legiti m ate military target
dep ends upon the contribu tion i ts des truction would make to the u ltimate
outcome of the war. As L.c. Green expl ai ns :
[T]he decision whether an o b j ective is legitimate or not d ep ends upon
the contribution an attack on th at objective will mak e to ultim ate
v ictor y or the success of the operation of which the attack is pan. B ut
with o bjects no rmal l y devoted to civilian use, su c h as s ch o ol s, h o sp i t a l s
o r pl a ce s of worsh ip, if there is any doub t they are being used for such
purposes or b e in g put to military use, they shall receive the benefit of
l�
the doubt and not be subjected to a tt ac k 2
.

However, tradi tional in terpreta tions of the necessi ty requiremen t have
given nations wi de latitude to con duct attacks against a b road range of
143
targets, including, for examp le, enemy merchan t sh ips and steel mines .
Belligerents have not found the necessity requiremen t difficul t to satisfy.

Proportionality . In add i tion to th e requirement that a nation conduct its
attack against a military o b jective, the extent of that attack must be
proportionate to the amoun t of force needed to des troy the target. Thus,
"[ e ]ven if the destructio n of a target satisfies the test of mili tary necessity,
1 44
The justification for this p art

excessive damage should be prohib i ted . ,,

of the test is tha t i t serves the goal of preven ting unnecess ary suffering on
the part of noncombatants. The tes t to determine whether the force em
145
I n other words, a nation m ay use

ployed h as b een ex cessive is ob j ective.

that amount of force necessary to accomplish i ts mission wh ich a reason
ab le nation would employ to accomplish a simi lar task. Hence, "it i s not a
b reach o f the law of armed con flict if civi lians suffer injury inci dental to
attack upo n a lawful m i litary objective, so long as such incidental injury is
not dispropo rtionate to the military objective which it is sought to
46
achieve . . . . , , 1
Intern ati onal Conventions on th e Laws of War
The treaties and conventions deal i ng with the laws of war codify the
custom ary requiremen ts of necessi ty and proportional i ty. For examp le,
the requirement of necessi ty may be found in Arti cle 2 3 (g) of the 1 907
Hague Convention, which prohib i ts nations from taking action "[t]o
destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such des tructio n or seizure
1 47
b e imperatively demanded by the necessiti es of war. ,,
The 1 949 Genev a
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Conventions echo this necessity requirement.

1 48

The proportio nality re

quirement also has been codi fi ed i nto the conventional law of war .
The principle of proponionality is embodied in Anicle 2 3(e) and (g)
of the Annex to the Hague Convention No. IV of 1 907 . In addition, it
is contained in several provisions of the 1 977 Protocol I: Article 25, the
firs t anicle of the section on m ethods and means of warfare, prohibits
in paragraph 2 the employment of weapons, projectiles and material
and methods of warfary f a nature to cause 'superfluous'
S
'unnecessary' suffering. 4

injury

or

Lessons
The p rimary lesson mili tary strategists s hould draw from both the
customary and conventional provisions of the law of war is that attacks
against any type of target must meet certain requirements. First, the strike
must occur against only those targets that reasonably merit attack. An
attack d esigned to destroy an enemy' s economic infrastructure, for exam
ple, must b ear some rational relationship to a military obj ective. Second,
the attack must not cause damage that leads to enormous civilian casu alties
or other sufferi ng. Th e intensi ty of the attack must correspond reasonably
with the minimum amount of fo rc e necessary to ensure the accomplish
ment of the mi litary mission. The mili tary planner of a coun ter-prolifera
tion mission during a time of war mus t keep these dictates in mind wh en
deciding on, and devis ing, such an attack.

Protocol I
Parti cularly i mportant to the discussion of counter-proliferation in the
wartime setting is the 1 9 77 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva
1 50
Convention of 1 949 .
This document outlines the requirements which
combatants must follow when engaged in armed conflict. Articl e 5 6 of the
Protocol specifically addresses th e targeting of nuclear reactors during
confli ct, restricting the ability of b elligerents to attack installations that
could release "dangerous forces" if destroyed . Other articl es of the Protocol
prohibit reprisals against civilians (Article 5 1 ) and attacks causing exces
151
sive harm to the envi ronment (Arti cle 35 ).

?;

Complicating an analysis o f Pro tocol I i s the fact that the United S tates
1 2
President Ronald Reagan decided not to sub m i t the

has no t rati fied i t .

Pro tocol to the S enate for ratificatio n. I n his letter to the Senate declari ng
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that he would not send the Protocol for ratifi catio n, President Reagan
" [Pro tocol I] contains p rovisions that would u nd erm i n e h u man i

s tated,

tari an l aw a nd en danger civilians in war. One o f i ts provisions, for exam pIe,

would autom a t ic a l l y treat as an i n tern ati o n a l con flict any so-call ed 'war of
national liberation.' . . . F i n a lly, the Joint Chi efs o f S taff have also con

cluded th a t a number o f th e provi sions of the Protocol are m il ita ri ly
l S3
u n acceptab l e . "
Desp i te the fact that the U nited States has not ratified the P rotocol,
several reasons warrant a study of i ts provi sions . First, the United States i s

a s i gn ato ry to the P rotoco L 1 S4 As su ch

Conve ntion on th e Law of Treaties ,

l

� ursu an t to Article 1 8 o f the Vienna
S

the U n ited S tates "is ob liged to

refrai n from acts which wou ld defeat [the Pro tocol's] ob j ect and pur

pose . . . u ntil it shal l h ave made its intentio n clear not to b ecome a party
15
to th e treaty.,, 6 Presid en t Reag an 's statement to the Senate mig h t suffice
as a clear proc l am a tio n that th e United S tates did not i n ten d to abi d e by

Proto col I's provisions. However, i t is also possible that this i n ternal U.S.
government communi ca ti on did not p rov i d e ad equ ate notice to the o ther
parties of the Pro tocol that th i s cou ntry did not intend to ab ide by i ts
provisions . It is possible that either the present or a future ad m i ni s tra tio n

will subm i t th e Protocol to the S enate for ratification. Moreover, according
to th e U . S. Department o f Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Coli n Powell noted that the law of war, i n c lu d i n g Proto col I, influenced
1 S7
decisions th ro ug h o u t the execution of the Persian Gulf War.
Such

consideration d emo n s trat es that the Protocol h as at least some influence

o n U.S. policy makers.

.

I

l--

f·

Although the United States has not ratified th e P ro tocol several mem
} S8
b ers of the North Atlanti c Treaty Organization (N ato) have.
S i n ce some
Nato memb ers are co n si d ering p arti cipa tion in the coun ter- p rolife ra tion
l S9
the limits p l ace d on the memb ers of Nato by Protocol I shoul d

ini tiative,

con cern U .S. mi litary p la n n ers . Furthermore, South Kore a, a key U. S . al ly

in Asi a, h as ratified the P rotoco l . 1 60 Final ly, while th e Protocol may

contain flaws, it can prov i d e us efu l guid a n ce to military s trategists on the

limi ts of mili tary fo rce in the cou n te r-pro l ifera ti o n eq u a tio n .

Article 56 . The key provision of the Protocol for the cou n ter-pro l i feration
discussion is Article 56, whi ch states, in part:
1. Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams,
dykes and nuclear electrical gen er a tin g stations, shall not be made the
object of attack, even where these objects are m ilitary objectives, if such
49
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attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe
losses among the c iv ilian population. Other m ilitary objectives located
at or in the vicinity of th ese works or installations shall not be made
the object of attack if such attack may cause the release of dangerous
forces from the works or installations and consequent severe losses
among the civilian population.

2. The special protection against attack provided by paragraph 1 shall
cease:

. . . (b) for a n uclear electrical generating station only if it provides
electric power in regular, s ignificant and d irect support of m ilitary
operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate
such support.

(c) for other military objectives located at or i n the vicinity of these
works or install at io ns only if they are used in regular, significant
and direct sup port of mil itary operations and if such attack is the
only feasible way to terminate such support . . . .

5. T he Parties to the conflict shall endeavor to avoid locating a ny
mil itary ob jectives in the v icinity of the works or installations men
tioned in paragraph 1 . Nevertheless, installations erected for the sale
purpose of defending the protected works or installations from attack
are p er m i ss i bl e and shall not themselves be made the object of attack,

prov id e d that they are not used in hostilities except for defensive
actions necessary to respond to attacks against the protected works or
installations and that their armament is limited to weapons capable
only of repelling hostile action against the pr ote c ted works or installa
tions .
.

.

,

The l anguage of this article may place significan t res trictions on a nation
contemplating the destruction of the mos t attractive targets in a counter
proliferation scenario. However) the scope of the article is the sub j ect of
intense debate) and i ts meaning requires a thorough exam in atio n of i ts
161

somewhat co nfusing text.

While the article protects "dams) dykes and nuclear electrical generating
stations)" this list is not intended to be exhaustive) because the article is
designed to protect any facility containing a "dangerous force" that could)
if the facility were des troyed, caus e "severe loss among the civilian popu
lation." Thus, an ini tial reading of the article appears to demons trate that
its l anguage may protect a nuclear reprocessing p lant containing fission
able material or a nuclear reactor devoted so lely to the production o f
weapons-grade plutonium) since t h e des truction of such faciliti es could
release radioactive material. This interpreta tion i s reinforced by noting
that even i f the facil i ty were used exclusively for mili tary purposes) and
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therefore normally would be a l egi timate target, it does not necessarily
sacrifice its protection from attack as "even . . . military o b j ectives" fal l
l 62
within t h e language of t h e arti cle.
However, b efore concluding that all nuclear faci lities are off-limits, one
must take the analysis of Arti cle 56 a s tep further. As Burrus Carnahan
notes, " there is no internatio nal standard for d etermining when civilian
casualties b eco me 'severe'; the party atta cking a nu clear power s tation and
the party defending it are likely to have very d ifferent ideas on that
1 63
subj ect.,,
The article allows an exception to the proh ibition for attacks
upon a "nuclear electrical generating station only if it provides electri c
power in regu lar, significant a n d direct support of military operations and
if such attack is the only feasib l e way to terminate such support." This
phrase app ears to allow an attack upon a nuclear reac tor supplying power
to a belligerent's armed forces; however, this provision is silent on attacks
agai nst other nuclear facili ties if they provide fissionab le material to a
164
b ell igerent's weapons development program .
The article contai ns an
exception allowing attacks agai nst " other mili tary obj ectives located at or
i n the vicini ty of thes e works o r i nstal lati ons only if they are used in regu lar,
s igni ficant and direct support o f m i litary operations . . . . " However, this
provision add resses attacks upon weapons systems, such as artil l ery and
surface-to-air missiles, devo ted to the defense of the facili ty co ntai ning the
dangerous fo rce. Consequently, the definition of "other mi litary obj ec
tives" would not appear to include a reprocessing or an enrichmen t plant.
Not surprisingly, scholars have co me to varyi ng con clusions regarding
Article 5 6 and i ts exceptio ns. Antho ny Leib ler, for ex ample, b elieves that
" the exceptions in Article 56 are discrete, specific and leave minimal scope
16S
for divergent interpretation. ,,
On the other hand, W. Hays Parks b e
lieves that the article does no t prohib it attacks against nuclear facilities
166
while Burrus Carnahan

utilized in a weapons d evelopment program,

simply concludes that " Article 56 seems more likely to pro duce co nfusion
and mutual recrimination than any genuine protection for civi lian popu-

·
1 67
·
I anons
In wa rtlme. ,,
Article 56 does not es tab l ish whether attacks against facilities dedicated
.

to the developmen t of nuclear weapons are permitted. The language of this
provision is too clou ded to conclude defini tively whether attacks against
these fac ilities are pro hib ited. States which are parties to the Pro tocol will
have to examine the question closely to determi ne an appropriate action.
From this analysis, one may conclude that a nation employi ng a counter
proliferatio n measure which attacks a facility co ntaining nucl ear material
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will face allegations that i t, i n fact, has violated Protocol ! . The Uni ted
States may point to two factors to defend i tself s hould it be sub jected to
such scrutiny. First, the U nited States, as noted above, has no t ratified the
Proto col, and co nsequently, its provisions should not apply to this cou ntry.
Second, U. S . policy makers could no te that the " rules embodied in Article
168
56 are not (at present) incorporated into customary international law.,,
Hence, the United S tates might argue that it may attack a belligerent's
facility containing a dangerous force so lo ng as that facility is a legitimate
military obj ective.
While the United States may be ab le to defen d i tself adequately agains t
allegations that it had violated Article

56,

some of its al lies that are

memb ers of Protoco l I may face a more daunti ng task in defending them

selves from similar allegations. South Korea, for example, as a member of
the Protoco l, may not be ab le to justify an attack agai nst a North Korean
nuclear facility if a res trictive interpretation of Article

56 is accepted . This

fact could represent a substantial obstacle for any U . S . counter-prolifera
tion endeavor agai nst North Korea which involves the deployment of
South Korean forces. If these fo rces are prevented from stri king the North
Korean nuclear program, it would then b ecome questionab le whether an
ally which has come to the ai d of South Korea, e.g., the U nited States, could
attack the North's facilities in its stead. Similar concerns cou ld face the
N ato alliance if it were to take a coun ter-proliferation action agai nst the
weapons development programs of, for example, either Iran or I raq .
Moreover, Article

8 5 (3)

specifies that a "grave b reach" of the Protocol

has transpired when a wilful attack releasing a da ngerous force occurs
agai nst a facility protected by Article 5 6 . 169 Article

85(5)

of the Protocol

s tates that such grave b reaches "shall b e regarded as war crimes ." Thus, a
b reach of Article 56 could lead to serious consequen ces against those who

ordered an attack resul ting i n the release of a dangerous force . Additional ly,

Article 9 1 of the Protocol mandates that offenders pay com pensation to
illegally attacked states.

Other Articles of Protocol I. Si nce Article

56

itself appears inconclusive

regarding the permissibility of attacks against nuclear facilities, i t b eco mes
important to examine other articles of the Protocol to determine whether
they can s h ed light on the issue. Aga in, while the U nited States has not
ratified this accord, i ts provisions must have some i nfluence upon the

?'1 since as of 1 992 seven ty-eight nations had either

international communit
ratified o r acceded to it.

0
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Articl e 5 7 (2 ) (a) (ii) of the Protocol codi fi es th e principle of proportion171
" ternatlona 1 1 aw,
d m cus tom ary m
&:
b y provl'd mg
'
a I,t ty loun
th at:
'

[T] hose who plan or decide upon an attack shall , , , take all feasible
precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view
to avoiding, and in any event of minim ising, incidental oss of civilian
2
life, injury to civilians and damage to c ivilian objects,1

j

The importance of this p rovision is enhanced when on e evaluates it in
rela tion to Article 3 5 ( 3 ) of the Protocol, wh ich proh ibits the employment
of "m ethods or means of warfare which are i ntende d, or may b e exp ected,
to cause widespread, long-term and severe d amage to the natural environ
173
Unfo rtunately, the la tter provision co ntains no explicit d efi ni
174
tion of wh at constitu tes " severe damage to the natural enviro nment.,,

ment,,,

However, a significan t rel eas e of radiation or radioactive materi al whi ch
con tamina tes the surrounding area presumably would qualify as th e type
of "severe d amage" con templated by Article 3 5 , As with the language o f
Article 5 6, a breach of Article 3 5 by a p arty to the Protocol cou ld lead to
severe consequences against those ordering and parti cipating in an attack

agai nst a nuclear facili ty that released signi ficant amounts of nuclear fallout

upon destruction .

Article 5 2(2) of t h e Protoco l provi des a defi nition of w h a t constitu tes a

military objective, th ereby codifying the custom ary i n ternation al law re
quirement of mili tary necessity. Attacks are "limited to those objects wh ich
by their nature, location, purpose or u se make an effective contribution to
mili tary action and whose total or partial des tructi o n, cap ture or neu trali
zati on, in the circumstan ces ruling at the time, offers a definite military
advantage." Like the customary internation al requirement of necessi ty, the
Proto col I stand ard i s obj ective, demanding that an at tack er employ rea
soned judgmen t when deciding which targets to attack .

Othe r Attempts to Protect Nuclear Facilities
I n ad di tion to the provisions of Protocol I, other diplomatic efforts to
estab lish accords to protec t nuclear faci lities fro m attack have transpired.
None of these attemp ts have b een successful; however, a portion of the
international communi ty has shown in terest i n es tab lishi ng some type of
convention prohibiti ng attacks against nuclear facili ties, and thus, these
efforts merit a brief discussion .
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Swedish Proposals for a Treaty Prohibiting Radiological Weapons and
the Rele ase or Dissemination of Radioactive Material for Hostile Pur
poses . In 1 9 80, the government of Sweden proposed a treaty that would
protect nuclear facili ties from attack during hostilities.

1 75

This initiative

would have prevented both the use of radioactive material as a weapon as
176
well as attacks ag ainst facilities that might release radioactive material .
The facili ties protected by the accord were to have been listed on a register
and subject to inspection by a multilateral agency similar to the IAEA .
T h e Swedish plan has not been accepted . A s Burrus Carnahan argues,
the United S tates has been particularly vocal in its opposition to the p lan :
The United States and its allies have refused to accept the inclusion of
attacks on nuclear facilities in a radiological weapons convention, and
Sweden and its supponers have insisted that this p roble m be covered.
The Swedish proposal poses practical military p rob lem s , not the least
of which are that it protects facilities that are legitimate m il itary targets
and would never permit an attack on a pro ected nuclear facility if
I7
radiation in any amount would be released.

;

A second prob lem facing the S wedish proposal is that i t would d epend
upon the credibility of safeguard insp ections similar to those that have

sought to protect the integrity of th e NPT. Given the haphazard record of
IAEA inspections in Iraq and the difficulties the

IAEA has faced in guaran

teeing North Korea's NPT compliance, it is unlikely that the international
community would have much confidence in s uch a regime.
Other discussions have occurred which have had the goal of creating a

b an on the use of radiological weapons . If adopted, such an agreemen t,
known as the Radiological Weapons Convention, not only would prohibit
the use of weapo ns such as the neutron bomb, but also would ban attacks
against facilities which could result in the release of radiation. A counter
proliferation attack against a nuclear facility would run afoul of such an
accord. As yet, no agreement has b een reached on the Radiological Weap
ons Convention, so attacks agai nst these facilities have not been explicitly
b anned.

The NPT Review Conferences . Every five years the signatory states to the
NPT hold a review conference to discuss issues relating to the treaty. A t

both th e 1 985 and 1990 conferences, t h e parties addressed the topic of
178
attacks against nuclear facilities.
Egyp t pres en ted a paper at the 1 985
conference linking attacks on nuclear facilities t o articles I I I and IV o f the
1 79
treaty.
Article III details the estab lishment of the safeguards regime
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under the NPT, whi le article IV gives each party to the treaty the right to
pursue peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Whi le the final conferen ce report
did not accep t al l aspects of the Egyptian proposal, it did s tate that an attack
on a safeguarded faci li ty would necess itate i mmediate U . N . Security Coun1 80
Cl' 1 attentlon.
.

The

1 990 revi ew conferen ce did not release a final report due to a dispute

among the parti es regarding the proposed adoption of a comprehensive b an
on the testing of nuclear warheads. However, "'[i]f a final declaration had
b een adopted, the

1 990

review conference would h ave encouraged all

parties to provide immediate assis tance to any other party to the treaty
whose safeguarded nuclear faci lities were attacked, and would also have
appealed to all s tates to consider the danger of releas ing rad ioactivi ty wh en
181
reviewing their mili tary doctrines. ,,
While none of these i ni tiatives has succeeded i n estab lishing a prohibi
tion against attacks on nuclear facilities, the poss ibility exi sts that th e topic
may be addressed again in the fu ture, particularly if an attack o n a nuclear
facili ty were to occur, resulting in the release of sign i fican t amounts of
radiation . The United S tates and i ts allies may face the p rospect that some
aspect of international law m ay expressl y forb id s trikes agai ns t nuclear
faci li ti es. Curren tly, th e norms of th e cus to mary international law of war
dictate that any attack agains t a nuclear facility no t cause disp roportionate
damage to either the env ironment or noncomb atan ts .

The Precedents
At leas t three i nci dents have occurred in the nuclear age in whi ch
weapons develop ment facil i ti es have come u nder at tack during a time of
war, not i ncluding the

198 1

Israeli attack on Tamu z I discussed earlier.

Th e three instances of attack were the Allied air s trikes on the German
ato mic bomb program during World War I I, at tacks by I ran and I raq upon
one ano ther's nuclear facilities duri ng their war between

1 980

and

1 988,

an d the attacks co ndu cted b y U . S .-led coalition forces against I raqi nuclear
facili ti es during the Gulf War of

1 99 1 .

A llied A ttacks against Nazi Atomic Facilities . During World War I I ,
Allied forces conducted a i r s tri kes against German ato mic facili ties located
I 82
in Norway.
The G ermans were using these facilities to ro duce the
I8
heavy water needed for the p roduction of an atomi c bomb .
The Al lied

p

attacks, which occu rred prior to the signing of the Geneva Conven tions
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and Protoco l I, were subject to the customary requirements of necessity
and proportionality.
Given the scope of the war and the need to prevent the construction of
a German bomb, i t is hard to dispute the need to attack these facilities. The
existence of a German bomb could have altered the course of the war in
Europe, perhaps compelling the Allies to settle with the Germans instead
of striving for total victo ry. Hence, the Allied attacks satisfied the first
element of the customary internatio nal law test. The Allies also fulfilled
the proportionality requirement of this test. The destruction of the heavy
water facilities did no t release great amounts of radioactive material that
could have caused severe civi lian casualties in Scandi navia or throughout
Europe.
Given the need for and the scope of the Allied efforts, it is probable that
the attacks on the German facilities would have ful filled the requirements
184
of Article S6 of Protocol I had they existed during World War 11.
First,
the heavy water facilities did not possess the type of "dangerous forces"
con templated by the article. Seco nd, even if they had, the need to attack
the facilities as a military objective would have fit within the exceptio n of
Article 56(2)(c). Moreover, the attacks would have fit within the confines
of both Article 52 on necessity and Article 57 on proportionality.
Attacks against Nuclear Facilities during the Iran-Iraq War. During the

war between Iran and Iraq, waged from 1 980 to 1 988, at various times the
I SS
Iranians attacked Iraqi nuclear facilities.
These attacks occurred after
the signing of Protocol I; however, Iran, although a signatory, had not
186
ratified the accord.
Theoretically, Article 18 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties required the Iranians to refrain from actions that
1 87
could have defeated the Protocol's purpose.
For that reason, one can
make the argument that the Iranians violated international law by ignoring
their treaty commitments and violated Article 56 of Protocol I .
As for the attacks themselves, assuming that the parties were not con
strained by the provisions of the Protocol, they too are judged by the
standards of the customary international law of war, namely the concepts
of necessity and proportionali ty. As no ted above, the necessi ty requiremen t
of this test is objective. Would a reasonable state similarly situated have
determined that the Iraqi facilities were a legitimate military objective and
made such an attack ? An affirmative answer to this question seems appro
priate. The international community was aware of the I raqi interest in
developing a nuclear weapon . Given the danger posed to Iran by the
56
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development of an I raqi nuclear weapon , it is reasonable to conclude that
targeting the facilities was legiti mate. Moreover, even had the attacks been
conducted solely to destroy the elec trical power capacity of I raq, the
I ranians could have justified these attacks o n the b asis of the need to disable
I raq's supply of energy to i ts war-sm.taining infrastructure an d m i li tary
forces .
The tes t for proportionali ty presen ts a s tiffer hurdle if the Iranian a ttacks
are to be justified . The fact that a debate existed about the p resence of
nuclear material at the Iraqi fa cilities assists in justifying the I ranian action.
Had the I raqi nuclear faciliti es unmistakab ly possessed the type of " dan
gerous forces" con templated by Arti cle 56 of the Protoco l, the I ranian

attacks would be sub ject to closer scrutiny. While I ran had not ratified the
Protocol, the effects of the attack could have violated the cus tomary
proportionality requirement. Had there b een a signi ficant re lease o f radia
tion from the Iraqi facili ties, i t could have caused massive civilian casual ties
(including wi thin I ran); however, given the fact that the I ranians were
never capable of completely destroying the faciliti es and tha t the i n troduc
tion of a n ucl ear capab i l i ty could have changed the war's balan ce, the
Iranian a t tacks pass the proportionality tes t. Fortunately, the a ttacks did
not result i n the release o f significant amounts of radiation over the Iraqi
coun tryside. Had such a calamity occurred, the analysi s regarding the
legali ty of the operation might have differed .
In light of this analysis, the attacks against the I raqi facili ties appear
legitimate. As Frits Kalshoven con cludes :

There is . . . little evidence that customary law already prohibits at
tacks on nuclear power stations other than in terms of the general
principles for the protection of the civilian population and civilian
objects. It seems therefore safe to conclude that as between the parties
to the [Iran- Iraq] Gulf War, an attack on a nuclear power station would
have been perfectly proper if there were sufficient grounds to regard
the object as a m ilitary objective and t he attack could be carried o u t
without unduly severe losses among the civilian population. I S8
The Iranian attacks sa tisfied bo th parts of this test. They should be
considered legi timate pursuant to the present tenets of customary intern a
tional law.
A similar analysis applies to I raqi attacks agains t the nuclear fad li ties of
Iran. The n ecessi ty and proportionality standards demanded that I raq
exercise a reasonab le amoun t of res train t wi th respect to their a ttacks
agai nst Iranian nuclear faciliti es. Again, as Kalshoven notes, th e Iraqi
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attacks in all likelihood were proper pursuant to the international legal
.
1 89
reqUirements 0 f th e d ay.

Anacks against Iraqi Nuclear Facilities during "Operation Desen
Storm. " The U . S .-led coalition repeatedly attacked the nuclear faci li ti es o f
Iraq during t h e Gulf War of 1 99 1 . U . S. fighter planes bombed two I raqi
190
The U.S .-led coalition conducted

res earch reactors located at Tuwaitha.

these attacks to prevent the I raqis from developing a nuclear device.
Preventing Iraqi proliferation became one of the major aims of the U ni ted
States . However, the legitimacy of these attacks s hould be examined. While
the assumption of the Uni ted States was that th ey were l egitim ate, s everal
issues sho uld be exami ned to d eterm ine whether the U.S. conclusion was
prop er.
The fi rst question is whether attacks against I raqi nuclear facilities were
part of the U.N. mandate to free Kuwait. No specific provision of any
Security Council Reso lutio n called for the destruction of Iraqi nuclear
191
Security Council Renlution 678 did authorize U . N. members
facilities.
192
to use force " to restore intern atio nal peace and security,,
to the region.
Perhaps th is phrase gave the coalition the requisite authority to attack the
facilities. However, some have ques tioned this assumption . Burrus Carna
han, for example, suggests that the attacks were not autho rized by Reso lu
tion 678, stating that the facili ties targeted were n ot a major p art of the I raqi
nuclear weapons develop ment program, and hence the attacks were ille
1 93
gitimate exploitations of the Resolutio n.
Settlement of this deb ate goes
1 94
beyo nd the scope of this p aper.
Howev er, the Resolution did not explic
itly prevent members of the coalition fro m employing any type of force
1 95
which they deemed necessary to i mplement the U . N . mandate.
The
as sumption might be that since the U nited Nations did not prohibit these
attacks, "it is probably fair to say that the U ni ted S tates and alli ed forces
196
conducted their operations in acco rdance with international law.,,
Kuwait and the United States also justified the attacks on the b asis of

collective self-d efense p ursuant to Article 5 1 of the Charter. Since the
adversaries were engaged in hostili ties, this action would not fall under the
rub ric of an ticip atory self-defense. Rather, th is action would be classified
within the parameters of trad itional, non-anticipatory self-defense. Even
if this justificati on were prop er, the attacks would be required to meet the
tes ts of the l aws of war.
Thus, the analysis return s to the traditional legal p rin cip les on the
l aws of war, specifically thos e regarding the factors of neces s i ty and
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proportionality. Did U.S. -led forces comply with these requirements when
conduc ting their attacks agai nst the Iraqi facilities ? Since the United S tates
took the lead in these attacks, did it comply with international law during
the raids ? This discussion is further complicated by the fact that som e
memb ers of the Gulf War coal ition had ratified Protocol I, and thus
theoretically were compelled to follow i ts p rovisions, including the man
dates of Arti cle 5 6 pertaining to the prohibition on the release of dangerous
forces . This prob lem is mitigated to a degree by the fact that two of the
major participants in the air attacks had not ratified the Protocol. The
Uni ted S tates and the United Kingdom are not among its members.
However, both S audi Arab i a, whose forces participated in these attacks and
from whose terri tory the attacks were staged, and Kuwait, whose pilo ts
1 97
participated i n the attacks, had ratified the Protocol,
thereby endanger
i ng the legality of their participation .
For the U nited States, the permissibility of the attacks on the I raqi
facili ties turns on their l egality under the provi s ions of th e cu stomary
international law of war. Once again, the requ irements of necessi ty and
proportionality p rovide th e stand ards by which such attacks are judged.
The necessity requirement in this case is met fairly easily, given th e b road
defini tion of the term "mili tary objective" and th e wi d e di scretion states
198
Since

have in determining si tes that qualify as targets sub ject to a ttack.

U.S. intelligence reports had concluded that the Iraqi faci l i ties were b eing
used for weapons research, it was reasonable for the Uni ted S tates to
con clude that attacking the faci lities was necessary. Although the facilities
1 99
given the Iraqi interes t in

at Tuwaitha were subject to IAEA inspection,

clandesti ne nucl ear weapons developmen t, the attacks were jus tified.
The proportionali ty requirement, however, rep resents a s terner test, fo r
a significan t release of radiation from any of the Iraqi nuclear facili ties was
2OO
conceivab le.
The United S tates and i ts Desert Storm allies had to "weigh
the in terests arisi ng from the success of the operation on the one hand,
agai nst the possib le harmful effect upon protected persons and obj ects on
the other. T here mu st, therefore, be an acceptable relati on b etween the
20 1
legitimate destructive effect and u ndesi rable collateral consequences .,,
The amount of radioactive materi al at the Iraqi faci liti es sub j ect to rel ease
by attack was u nknown. It may be hoped that the U ni ted States and i ts
allies seriously consi dered the possibility of a signi fi can t rel eas e of radio
active material b efore engaging in thei r attacks . If they did, coming to the
reasonab le conclusion that the potential for signi fi cant radioactive release
was mini mal, then the attacks may be considered justified. However, if the
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United States failed to study th e possib ility of release, yet targeted the
facilities nonetheless, the attacks might not pass the proportionality re

qui rement (in spite of the fact that no radiation ultimately leaked), because

a reasonable nation would have considered the possibility of a radiation

release. T he Iraqis accused the United States of attacking without regard

to th e possibility of the release of radioactive ma teri al. U.S. representatives
202
denied the accusation.
A P ropo sed Le gal Test fo r Attacks ag ai n st Faci lities Contai n i n g
N u clear Mate ri al in a Time of War

an

Th ese precedents provide several les sons for any n ation contemplati ng

attack agai nst ano th er's nuclear facili ties during armed conflict. Thes e

types of s trikes are not always jus tified, because they m ay violate either part

of the customary i n tem ational l aw test for permissible attacks, being either
not necessary or not p roportion al . Moreover, if the state has ratified

Protocol I, it mus t consider whether Arti cle 56 proh ibits such attacks. If
so, then, at leas t for legal purposes, th e s tate must find some alternative
means to eliminate the adversary's nuclear capab il ity.
For the Uni ted S tates, which is not bound by the language of Arti cle 56,

the requirements are somewhat easier to satisfy; however, U . S. m ilitary

planners s till mus t ob ey the requi rements of the customary in ternational

law of armed conflict. In Ugh t of this fact, the paragraph s below propose a

three-part tes t designed to make easier any determin ation regarding the

pe rm is s ibi lity of an attack. Although other factors m ay contribute to a
decision by the United States to attack another nation's nuclear facili ties
during war, th is test will give U . S . policy makers some idea of the potential
legal ramifi cations of thei r actions

Is

.

the Target a Legitimate Military Objective?

If the target possesses no

legitimate mili tary value, then all forms of international law proh ibit an

attack against i t. U . S . decision makers must establish that the target b ears

some rational relationship to the m i l i tary capabilities of th e adversary. This
2
s tandard h i storica l ly has not b een difficult to meet 03 1 f the target repre
.

sents a legitimate m i litary ob jective, despi te the fact that it con tai ns

fissionab le material, th en in ternational law permi ts the attack to this point.

However, the i nquiry does not end here, b ecause the attacker s till mus t

satisfy th e proportionality requirement.
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Would the A ttack Endanger Noncombatants? I f the targe t were in an
isola ted area or if it were possible to des troy the target without causing a
significant release of radioactive material, then the attack presumably
would no t endanger the lives of noncombatants on a significant scale. The
attack wou ld satisfy the propo nionali ty requirement. The isolated location
of these facilities would make the tas k o f U .S. military planners far s i mp ler.
The attack would pass both the necessity and proportionality stipulations,
and be legitimate.
Targets co ntaining fissionable material are rarely in a reas devoid of
civilians. O ften such facilities are located in areas with large popUlatio n s .
Furthermore, i t might prove d i ffi cu l t to d es troy the facili ty with confi
dence withou t accepting some chan ce that the at tack would releas e at least
some radioac tive material. If such a releas e were to occur, planners mus t
con sid er met eorological conditions in their calcul ations regarding an at
tack's permissibility. The question then turns on the exten t of material
released and the numb er of casual ties reasonably expected due to the
facili ty's d estruction.

Are the Likely Casualties Disproportionate to the Need to Destroy the
Facility? A high likelihood that destruction of a nu clear facility would
produce severe civilian casual ti es would suggest that such an attack would
violate internation al law. The losses would b e out of proportion with the
need to attack un less some overwhelming justification could b e d emon
strated . For the U ni ted States, such a requirement might p rove virtu ally
impossible to m eet. The main tenance of the nuclear status

quo

would not

jus tify an attack tha t caused the catas trophic loss of civilian life. Rather,
the U nited States would have to provide eviden ce that the destruction of
an adversary's nuclear facilities was the only way to preven t a devastating
nuclear attack against its forces or population or those of an ally. The
international communi ty probab ly would find anything less than this
justification insufficient to satisfy the proportionality requi rement.

Con clusion s D rawn from the Laws of War
A ttacks against facil i ti es con taining nu clear material during a time of
armed conflict must meet stringent conditions to satisfy the requirements
of t he laws of war. Although the United States has not ratified Protocol I ,
and therefore is not b o u n d b y i t s terms, t h e requirements of customary
international law pose challenging obstacles to the use of armed force
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agains t a facility containing fissionab le material. If the Uni ted S tates
desires to target such facili ties, it should develop me thods that would
prevent the release of large amounts of radioactive fallout that could
produce enormous environmental destruc tion and severe civilian casual
ties . Without such methods, the United States may have to attack support
facili ti es and weapon delivery systems to accomplish its military ob jectives.
The legal risks associated with a release of radioactive material may be too

great to attempt attacks on a facility con taining nuclear material during a
time a war.
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VIKK
Conclusions and Recommendations

OUNTER-PROLIFERATION should become a key element in a compre
C hensive U . S . nonprol iferation strategy. As p art of this strategy,

U.S.

policy makers must prepare for th e selective application of coun ter-prol if
eration in its most aggressive forms. Whi le it may be hoped that such an
application wi ll prove unnecessary, it is in the i n teres ts of the Uni ted S tates
to have this option avai lable.
While the NYf and traditional nonprol iferation schemes have worked
reasonably well in contai ni ng the spread of nuclear weapons, economic and
political pressures are build ing that are making it more difficult for the
nonproliferation regi me to survive. These pressures wil l continue to build
even though the NYf was extended i n 1 995 for an indefinite period. The
pressures on th e nonp roliferation regi m e include the spread of sophis ti 
cated technology applicable in both the civilian and military sph eres ; the
dissolution of the Sovi e t U nion, which has released into the global market
both human expertise and poorly controlled fissionable materi al for use by
potenti al prol iferants; the limited resources and effectiveness of the IAEA ;
the limi ted scope of the language of the NYf; and the ongoing ambitions
of a few s tates wh ich are motiva ted for a vari ety of reasons to acquire a
nuclear devi ce.
In th is environment, a time may arise when, despi te i ts b est efforts, the
Uni ted States confronts a nation wi th advers e i nterests that i s on the verge
of obtaining a nuclear weapon. For example, given U.S. strategic interests
in the Persian Gulf region and Iran's current antipathy toward the Uni ted
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States, U.S. policy makers may be unwilling to tolerate an Iran armed with
nuclear weapons. The present nonproliferation regime is designed to avoid
this scenario; however, that regime might fail, and the U nited S tates must
have options, including military options, to address this possibility.
The adoption of a cou nter-proliferation strategy fills that need. This
paper has attempted to present the international legal challenges th at the
United S tates would face in the application of th e counter-proliferation
option . U . S. policy makers must recognize that the international legality
of the application of counter-proliferation in its interdiction form is high ly
questionable under the present i nterpretations of i ntematio nal l aw and
may jeopardize the position of the United States within the international
community. Whether or not a norm prohibiting the proliferation of nu
clear weapons may exist, particular ly for signatories of the NPT, no accepted
mechanism involving the application of force exists to enforce that norm.
A U.S. counter-proliferation strategy could fill this void; however, the
introduction of the strategy will produce costs, including exposing the
United S tates to allegations of an i ntentional violation of international law .
Application of the strategy wou ld endanger the viab ility of the NPT,
especially if the nation subj ect to the strike were an NPT member an d
evidence of its nuclear ambitions were less than unquestion ab l e, perhaps
even admitted .
Despite these legal barriers, the United States should pursue the
counter-proliferation strategy. Conceivably, the Uni ted States might s eek
to expend diplomatic capital in an attempt to l egitim ize th e appli cation of
forceful counter-proliferation . Besides the fact th at this effort would meet
with resistance, such a ch ange could be undesirab l e for th e United States,
because if th e application offorceful counter-proliferation becomes accept
ab le wi thin the international com munity, it would b ecome available to
states other than the Uni ted States. In such an environment, some nations
might undertake a counter-proliferation strike that would be legitimate in
the eyes of international community bu t adverse to U.S. interests. The
United S tates would not wan t an international legal environment in which
an Indian counter-proliferation strike against Pakistan, for example, were
l egitimate. Furthermore, other states might use counter-proliferation as a
shi eld to justify otherwise illegitimate attacks .
Barring the establishment of a new norm permitting counter-proliferation
strikes in their most aggressive form, any U.S. strike in a peacetime setting
almost certainly would violate the current tenets of international law. Such a
strike, depending upon its consequences, also might violate the laws of armed
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conflict during war. While this would be unfortunate, the United States
should not sacrifice a potentially valuable strategic tool that could stem
proliferation and enhance U . S . national security simply to maintain perfect
adherence to a set of international legal rules that in many ways may have
become outdated. Such b lind adherence would place concerns about the
nation's stature within the in ternational community above all other na
204
Abandoning the counter-proliferation option
tional securi ty in terests.
simply to conform to outdated international standards would be unwise.

In ternatio nal co ncerns have changed dramatically since the co nc l u s i on

of the Cold War. No longer must the United S tates focus on containi ng the
Soviet threat at the expense of other national s ecuri ty i nterests. Rather, this
nation mus t fashion a mod ern s ecurity po licy tha t addresses the dangers
of the post-Cold War era . A strategy of coun ter-proliferation s hould p lay a
part i n this scheme; however, those who develop this policy must compre
hend both i ts lega l and poli tical impli cations. Failure to do so will ensure
that the adoption of a s trategy of counter-proliferation not only will violate
the stipul ations of international law but also migh t sacrifice the nonprolif
eration regime and j eopardize the status of th e U nited Sta tes within the
in ternational community withou t enhancing th e security of the nation.
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203 . C arna han , p . 529.

204. The U. S. dependence on nuclear deterren ce and the

U.S. reluctance to renounce

an y use of nuclear weapons provides a n apt analogy to th is analysis. The Un ited Nations
General Assemb ly has passed a resolution prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons and h as

called for nuclear disarmamen t. Desp i te this pro noun cem ent , the United States is not about

to disarm simply because the use of nu clear weapons might violate internation al law. S uch
disarm amen t would be adverse to

U.S. nation al interes ts.

Albeit on

a

sm aller scale,

sacrificing counter-proliferation also would be adverse to the n ational in teres ts.
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